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Executive summary
This report on the context of REDD+ in the Lao 
People’s Democratic Republic is a contribution 
by the EU-funded project “Impacts of Reducing 
Emissions from Deforestation and Forest 
Degradation and Enhancing Carbon Stocks 
(I-REDD+)” to Component 1 of the Global 
Comparative Study on REDD+ conducted by 
the Center for International Forestry Research 
(Brockhaus and Di Gregorio 2012). The aim is 
to provide an overview and analysis of the drivers 
of deforestation and forest degradation (both 
direct and indirect), institutional arrangements for 
the forestry sector in general and for REDD+ in 
particular, the political economy underlying the 
drivers of deforestation and forest degradation, 
and the existing legal frameworks for REDD+ and 
their implications for achieving effective, efficient 
and equitable outcomes from REDD+ in Laos 
(Brockhaus et al. 2012).  
Laos is receiving considerable international 
attention and support to implement REDD+. 
Forest covers more than 40% of the country’s 
total land area (9,500,000 ha), although this has 
followed a fairly consistent forest loss of about 
0.7% a year since 1982. The main direct drivers of 
deforestation are agricultural expansion — by both 
individual farmers and large-scale agribusinesses —
and the development of industrial tree plantations 
and large hydropower, mining and infrastructure 
projects. Shifting cultivation and selective logging 
are blamed for forest degradation. The indirect 
drivers of deforestation and forest degradation 
are rooted in the national agenda for economic 
growth. With investors from neighboring countries 
such as Vietnam, Thailand and China keen to 
gain access to the country’s land and natural 
resources, the government of Laos has sought to 
encourage private investment in hydropower, 
mining, agriculture and forestry as a way of 
boosting the national economy. As a result, with 
private investors providing the financial, technical 
and human resources that the country needs for 
rural development, Laos is becoming an important 
resource frontier for transnational capital and 
large-scale land and natural resource investments. 
The consequent intensification of competition 
over resources poses a challenge not only for 
forest governance, but also for the development of 
REDD+ policies and initiatives in Laos.
The government of Laos has long sought to curb 
deforestation and forest degradation. The main 
approach for doing so, as identified in Laos’ 
Readiness Preparation Proposal for REDD+ 
(R-PP) submitted to the World Bank’s Forest 
Carbon Partnership Facility (FCPF), consists 
of a combination of law enforcement, land-use 
planning and farm extension activities. Several 
policies and programs have also been introduced 
with the aim of strengthening land and forest 
governance. A nationwide program of land-use 
planning and land allocation was initiated in 
the early 1990s with the aim of clarifying village 
boundaries, regulating local access to land and 
forest resources, and limiting shifting cultivation. 
Since the 1990s, the government has marked out 
some 12.5 million ha (more than 50% of the 
national territory) as state conservation, production 
and protection forests. 
However, Laos’ persistent shortage of financial 
and human resources has impeded the effective 
implementation of such initiatives. Outcomes have 
generally been unclear. For example, although de 
jure centralization of forest governance has been 
achieved, local communities and other nonstate 
actors continue to have de facto influence over 
forest resource management and use. Moreover, 
the country’s focus on national economic growth 
and associated encouragement of both domestic 
and foreign companies to invest in timber 
harvesting creates not only a need for strong 
political commitment but also trade-offs. If existing 
interests and power conflicts continue to prevail, 
efforts to address the drivers of deforestation 
and forest degradation may ultimately prove 
unsuccessful. 
REDD+ came onto Laos’ national agenda in 2007. 
The government sees REDD+ as a potentially 
important source of the technical and financial 
support it needs to achieve its longstanding 
afforestation and reforestation objectives. With 
stimulus from the FCPF, a national, cross-
sectoral REDD+ taskforce was established in 
x  
November 2008 to coordinate the country’s 
REDD+ readiness activities. The government of 
Laos favors a hybrid approach to REDD+ that 
incorporates multiple funding strategies (bilateral, 
multilateral and commercial) and implementation 
at national, subnational and project levels. Laos 
obtained a formulation grant from the FCPF in 
October 2009 and submitted its R-PP in 2010. 
The latter was approved in October 2012. A USD 
30 million investment plan was also approved 
by the World Bank’s Forest Investment Program 
(FIP) in January 2012. Since 2009, bilateral and 
multilateral projects have played an important role 
in supporting the design of the national REDD+ 
framework and subnational pilot activities. Private 
sector actors have also been active in developing 
public–private partnerships and subnational 
projects for REDD+. Given the lack of strong 
domestic civil society, international development 
agencies, international NGOs and private 
companies have been the main stakeholders in 
consultation processes, which have generally been 
limited to the national level.
No clear proposals for REDD+ benefit sharing in 
Laos have been put forward, partly because of the 
government’s preference for a flexible approach 
that would allow the country to explore a range of 
options. Factors that need addressing are the lack 
of clarity over carbon rights, the conflict between 
formal and customary rights, and the absence 
of any specific legal provisions on indigenous 
rights, all of which could compromise the equity, 
effectiveness and efficiency of REDD+.
Laos has created a broadly defined institutional 
architecture for REDD+, whereby the National 
Environmental Council is linked to the National 
REDD+ Taskforce and then to REDD+ offices 
at the central and provincial levels. The details 
of REDD+ policy options — such as reference 
emission levels, monitoring, reporting and 
verification, benefit sharing and stakeholder 
participation — continue to be discussed 
at the central level. To ensure the effective 
implementation of REDD+, policy makers must:
1. strengthen cross-sectoral coordination and 
information sharing, in order to reduce 
transaction costs, improve information flows, 
and enhance access to information and 
planning decisions
2. develop institutions and incentives to reduce 
the gaps between policy and practice 
3. set correct crediting baselines and define 
conditions for additionality
4. establish social and environmental safeguards 
that ensure distributive, procedural and 
contextual equity; too often, civil society and 
the general population have little participation 
in land-use planning and negotiations over 
land concession agreements.
If REDD+ in Laos is to be effective and efficient, 
substantial investment is needed to build the 
capacity of administrative and technical staff, 
especially at the subnational level; to clarify and 
harmonize land-use planning and land allocation 
processes; and to strengthen monitoring and 
law enforcement in areas under high threat of 
deforestation and forest degradation. To ensure 
equitable outcomes of REDD+, Laos needs an 
accountable and transparent benefit-sharing 
mechanism across levels, accountable consultation 
processes, and meaningful participation of not 
only the elite and powerful actors but also of local 
groups, civil society organizations and NGOs. 
1 Introduction
Reducing Emissions from Deforestation
and forest Degradation plus conservation,
sustainable management of forests and
enhancement of forest carbon stocks (REDD+) 
has become increasingly complex and controversial 
in the years since Costa Rica and Papua New 
Guinea introduced the concept at the 11th 
Conference of the Parties (COP) to the United 
Nations Framework Convention on Climate 
Change (UNFCCC) in Montreal in December 
2005. As REDD+ has evolved, it has come to be 
expected to generate not only financial incentives 
for developing countries to reduce greenhouse gas 
emissions and sustain economic growth by halting 
or preventing the destruction of their forests, but 
also the political will to improve forest governance. 
Although Laos has a fairly small area of primary 
forest compared with countries such as Indonesia 
and Thailand (FAO 2011), natural forest accounts 
for the largest proportion of its land area among all 
Southeast Asian countries. Over the past decade, 
the country has become an important “resource 
frontier” for transnational capital and large-scale 
land investments, raising concerns about the rates 
of deforestation and forest degradation (Baird 
2011). As a result, Laos is receiving marked 
attention from the international community and 
significant technical and financial support to 
develop and implement REDD+ mechanisms. The 
government of Laos has demonstrated its interest 
in REDD+ by establishing institutions such as 
a REDD+ taskforce and supporting REDD+ 
pilot projects funded by donors and international 
NGOs. The aim of this report is to provide 
information on how REDD+ has developed so far 
and to analyze the key socioeconomic and political 
processes, opportunities and constraints that are 
likely to affect the design and implementation of 
REDD+ in Laos.
The report is a contribution to CIFOR’s Global 
Comparative Study on REDD+ by I-REDD+, 
or “Impacts of Reducing Emissions from 
Deforestation and Forest Degradation and 
Enhancing Carbon Stocks”, a project funded by 
the European Community’s Seventh Framework 
Research Programme (http://www.i-redd.eu/). 
I-REDD+ is a 4-year international research 
initiative, which was launched in 2011 with the 
main objective of ensuring that the design and 
implementation of future REDD+ mechanisms 
are based on appropriate knowledge about 
carbon storage in landscapes, carbon monitoring 
technology, potential impacts on local livelihoods 
and ecosystem services, and institutions overseeing 
access to resources and payments. Interdisciplinary 
research on these issues is being conducted from 
the local to the regional level in four Southeast 
Asian countries: Laos, Vietnam, China (Yunnan) 
and Indonesia. The Global Comparative Study on 
REDD+ aims to provide policy makers, donors 
and practitioners with strategic information and 
analyses of the opportunities and challenges for 
REDD+ in tropical forest countries. The present 
document has been produced through the 
alignment of these two research initiatives. 
Within this broad institutional framework, a 
research team comprising researchers from the 
Faculty of Forestry of the National University 
of Laos, the French Institute of Research for 
Development and CIFOR was set up. The team 
studied the history and current status of forest 
governance, deforestation and forest degradation 
in Laos, and the associated challenges for REDD+, 
primarily by reviewing a wide range of documents, 
including gray literature, scientific papers, laws 
and decrees, and government strategies. The 
authors also made direct observations during 
national workshops and meetings related to 
REDD+ in Laos, compiling data from recorded 
conversations during meetings and informal 
discussions. The findings of this study were 
reviewed by external reviewers who have worked 
with the Lao forestry sector for several decades and 
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verified by participants in a national consultation 
workshop held in Vientiane in May 2013, 
comprising representatives from government 
offices, nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), 
civil society organizations (CSOs), donors and 
international research institutes.
To aid intercountry comparability, the authors 
follow the global comparative guidelines for 
country profiles developed by Brockhaus et 
al. (2012). The report is organized as follows. 
In Section 2, we examine the main drivers of 
deforestation and forest degradation in Laos and 
assess the underlying causes. Section 3 contains 
an examination of the institutions that govern the 
forestry sector. In particular, we study the state of 
forest governance and resource rights and discuss 
their potential implications for the development 
of future REDD+ mechanisms. Section 4 attempts 
to place Laos’ forestry sector within the broader 
political economy, highlighting the recent impacts 
of transnational trade and investment on land and 
forest use and management in Laos. Section 5 
summarizes the current and planned institutional 
and organizational arrangements for developing 
and implementing national REDD+ policy in 
the country. In Section 6, we assess the trends in 
natural resource governance, planned policies, and 
the opportunities and constraints associated with 
REDD+ in light of their implications for achieving 
efficiency, effectiveness and equity (the “3Es”) in 
REDD+ outcomes. We conclude, in Section 7, 
with some policy recommendations.
Drivers of deforestation and forest 
degradation
2
2.1. Current forest cover and historical 
overview of past forest cover change
2.1.1. Forest cover change
Since 1982, the average annual rate of 
deforestation in Laos has amounted to 
approximately 0.7% (76,000 ha/year), reducing 
the national forest cover from 49% in 1982 to 
45% in 1992 and 41.5% in 2002. According to 
preliminary data from the latest national forest 
cover assessment (undertaken in 2010 but not 
yet officially released), about 40% of the country 
(9,500,000 ha) is estimated to be forest, natural or 
planted.
2.1.2. Land-use categories and terminology
Laos’ 2007 Forestry Law does not define “forest”, 
but its forest cover assessments generally define 
forest as an area spanning at least 0.5 ha, of 
which at least 20% of the crown cover comprises 
trees that will reach a height of at least 5 m after 
maturity (GoL 2005b); this is the definition of 
forest that the government of Laos submitted to 
the UNFCCC. The land-use categories applied 
by the forestry administration during recent 
monitoring exercises are defined in Table 1. 
During the most recent National Forest Inventory, 
conducted 2011–2012, only five forest types were 
mapped: evergreen, mixed broadleaf/coniferous, 
mixed deciduous, dry dipterocarp and coniferous.
It should be noted that the term “shifting 
cultivation” is not used uniformly, which creates 
difficulties in interpreting available data on land 
use and forest change. The national Forestry 
Strategy 2020 (GoL 2005a) differentiates between 
“pioneering shifting cultivation”, applicable to 
deforestation of areas that have never been used 
for crop production, and “rotational shifting 
cultivation”, responsible for rotational clearing of 
fallow forest. However, these terms are not used 
consistently. On the one hand, the term “shifting 
cultivation area” is used for the whole area where 
rotational cultivation is practiced, that is, the area 
under crop and forest fallows. On the other hand, 
fallows are considered “Current Forest” one year 
after the crop area is abandoned if the crown cover 
exceeds 20%. Further confusion arises when others 
use the terms differently (Rigg 2005): “pioneering 
shifting cultivation” is often used as a synonym for 
“shifting cultivation”, and “rotational cultivation” is 
often called “rotational shifting cultivation”. Others 
do not differentiate between these two types.
Moreover, the current definitions of “degraded 
forest” or “barren unstocked forest land”, which 
can be zoned for conversion into planted forests, 
have major implications for REDD+. An example 
is where villagers clear forest land (classified as 
“Current Forest”) for swidden agriculture; these 
lands would then presumably enter the category 
of “Potential Forest”, but plantation developers 
could classify these spaces as “degraded/unstocked 
forest” and seek to have them included in REDD+ 
frameworks.
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Table 1. Land-use categories as applied by the Lao forestry administration.
Land-use 
category
Definition
Current Forests Natural forest and plantations spanning at least 0.5 ha, of which at least 20% of the crown cover 
comprises trees that will reach a height of at least 5 m after maturity. Current Forests are further 
subdivided into the following nine forest types : 
1. Upper Dry Evergreen Forest is located at an altitude above 200 m and characterized by the 
species Hopea spp. (Mai Khen), Pterocarpus pedatus (Mai Do), Dipterocarpus alatus (Mai Nhang), 
Lagerstroemia spp. (Mai Peua) and Anisoptera spp (Mai Bak). The height of upper and second stories 
is usually less than in Lower Dry Evergreen Forest.
2. Lower Dry Evergreen Forest is located at an altitude below 200 m and is otherwise similar to Upper 
Dry Evergreen Forest. The second story is usually dense and the height (10–30 m) is usually quite 
even within a stand.
3. Upper Mixed Deciduous Forest contains more than 50% deciduous trees and is located at an 
altitude above 200 m. While in moist areas with a lot of climbers it might be difficult to distinguish 
this forest type from the Dry Evergreen Forest, the difference is clear in dry regions. Upper Mixed 
Deciduous Forest appears to be more open than Dry Evergreen Forest and might contain a 
considerable amount of bamboo and undergrowth.
4. Lower Mixed Deciduous Forest is located at an altitude below 200 m and otherwise has similar 
characteristics to those of Upper Mixed Deciduous Forest.
5. Dry Dipterocarp Forest occurs as open stands and reaches a height of 8–25 m. With crown cover of 
less than 20%, this vegetation type forms savannah within the category of Other Wooded Areas. 
Some typical species for this forest, such as Dipterocarpus intricatus (Mai Sabeng), Dipterocarpus 
obtusifolius (Mai Sat), Shorea obtusa (Mai Chick), Shorea siamensis (Mai Hang) and Terminalia 
tomentosa (Mai Suak) are characterized by thick, fire-resistant bark. 
6. Gallery Forest is not characterized by tree species composition and can be either deciduous or 
evergreen. It occurs along rivers and streams in bands of up to 100 m width.
7. Coniferous Forest is usually single storied and open but young growth may form a dense second 
story. It occurs in higher elevations with a cool climate. Usually Pinus spp. and less often other 
conifer species such as Cunninghamia sp. are dominant. 
8. Mixed Coniferous / Broadleaf Forest is located at higher elevations and forms a transition between 
coniferous and deciduous or evergreen broadleaf forests.
9. Plantation Forest covers planted forests including rubber plantations and excluding coffee, tea and 
fruit tree plantations. Contrary to the definition of “forest”, young tree plantations with less than 
20% crown cover are considered Plantation Forest and consequently Current Forest. Because of 
the limited extent of Plantation Forest at the time of the forest cover assessments, this inclusion of 
areas with less than 20% crown cover in the category Current Forest is insignificant.
Potential Forests Areas where the crown cover has fallen below 20%, e.g., because of logging or shifting cultivation, 
and which have the potential to regenerate to a state of more than 20% crown cover. Potential Forest 
consists of:
•	 Unstocked Forest areas, where the crown cover has fallen below 20%, e.g., because of logging or 
shifting cultivation, and which have the potential to regenerate to a state of more than 20% crown 
cover
•	 Ray/Shifting Cultivation areas, after clear-cutting and until 1 year after abandonment
•	 Bamboo areas, with a crown cover below 5% and dominated by bamboo species (at least 80% of 
total cover of understory).
Other Wooded 
Areas (vegetation 
types: savannah, 
heath, scrub)
Areas with trees where the crown cover will never reach 20% because of site conditions
Permanent 
Agriculture
Rice paddies, agricultural plantations, other agricultural areas
Other Non-Forest 
Land
Grassland, rocks, swamp, urban/built-up areas
Source: GoL (2005b) 
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2.1.3. State forests and categories
The national Forestry Law identifies three categories of state forests based on their functions (Table 2).
About 12.5 million ha (more than 50% of the country’s land area) is delineated as state forest (see Table 
3 and Figure 1). According to the national government (GoL 2011b), protection forest areas could 
span 8.2 million ha in the future, of which 2.59 million ha would be covered with forest. A further 
3.29 million ha of forest (13.9% of the country’s land area) is located outside state forest areas (GoL 
2011b). With the ongoing demarcation of protection forest areas, this area will decrease, which could have 
potentially adverse impacts on local communities, through restriction of their access to forest resources.
Table 2. Forest categories in Laos, according to 2007 Forestry Law.
Category Functions
Conservation 
forests and national 
protected areas (NPAs)
Conservation of nature; preservation of plant and animal species as well 
as forest ecosystems and other sites of natural, historical, cultural, tourism, 
environmental, educational and scientific research importance. These are 
subdivided into total protection zones (all land uses prohibited), controlled use 
zones (permanent agriculture, noncommercial logging and collection of forest 
products allowed), corridor zones (collection of forest products allowed) and 
buffer zones (noncommercial logging and collection of forest products allowed).
Protection forests Protection of the environment; protection from natural disasters; prevention of 
soil erosion; protection of water resources, riverbanks, roadsides and soil quality; 
the protection of strategic areas for national defense. These are subdivided 
into total protection zones (all land uses prohibited) and controlled use zones 
(permanent agriculture, noncommercial logging and collection of forest 
products allowed).
Production forests Natural and planted forests that serve the purpose of production of timber 
and other forest products to satisfy business demands and the requirements 
of national socioeconomic development and people’s livelihoods. These are 
subdivided into forest management areas (devoted to timber extraction) 
and village-use zones (permanent agriculture, noncommercial logging and 
collection of forest products allowed).
Table 3. Number, size and forest cover of state forest areas in Laos.
State forest category Management level No. Area (ha)a Area forested (ha)a
Conservation forest
National 24 3,500,000
2,370,000Provincial 76 644,000
District 143 495,000
Production forest National 51 3,089,000 1,300,000
Protection forests
(delineation ongoing)
National 262 4,758,000
2,570,000Provincial n.a. n.a.
District n.a. n.a.
Total 12,486,000 6,240,000
a Figures are estimates only because of high variations in source data. 
Sources: GoL (2010b, 2011a); Watt (2010)
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Figure 1. Forest cover in Laos, 2010.
Source: GoL (2011a)
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2.1.4. Land-use changes and forest cover 
trends
2.1.4.1. Historical trends in deforestation
An analysis of the historical trends in land-use 
change, and hence in deforestation and forest 
degradation, in Laos is contained in the country’s 
Readiness Preparation Proposal (R-PP) (Watt 
2010). The analysis drew on data from the 
following sources: three nationwide surveys of land 
use and forest cover for 1982, 1992 and 2002, 
conducted by the Forest Inventory and Planning 
Division under the Department of Forestry in 
the Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry (“FIPD 
sample data”); the Forest Cover Monitoring 
Project by the Mekong River Commission 
for 1993 and 1997 (“FCMP data”); and two 
additional GIS layers for FIPD for 1992 and 2002 
(“FIDP GIS data”). The FIPD sample data and 
data from the National Forest Inventory conducted 
between 1993 and 1999 were the official sources 
for the UN Forest and Agriculture Organization’s 
Global Forest Resource Assessment (FAO 2010). 
According to the FIPD data, actual forest cover 
decreased from 49% of the national territory in 
1982 to 45% in 1992 and to 41.5% in 2002 
(Table 4). This represents an annual deforestation 
rate of 0.4% (46,000 ha) between 1982 and 1992 
and of 1.2% (134,000 ha) between 1992 and 
2002. The FCMP data, however, show a different 
picture, with 39% forest cover in 1993 and 38% 
in 1997 and a lower average annual deforestation 
rate of 0.5% (46,000 ha) between 1993 and 1997. 
Deforestation rates after 2002 are not available 
because the government has not officially released 
the data from the most recent FIPD forest cover 
assessment. However, according to preliminary 
findings, in 2010 the overall forest cover had 
further decreased to 40% of the country’s land 
area, or 9,500,000 ha (GoL 2011b).
The data sets show some differences between 
geographic regions. According to the FIPD 
sample data, annual deforestation slowed down in 
the northern part of the country; indeed, in the 
northwestern provinces of Luang Namtha, Bokeo 
and Oudomxay, forest cover increased by 600–
900 ha/year between 1992 and 2002. By contrast, 
high deforestation of 17,000–40,000 ha/year 
occurred in the former Xaisomboun Special Zone 
(now part of Vientiane and Xiengkuang Provinces) 
and the southern provinces Bolikhamxay and 
Savannakhet. Between 1992 and 2002, the average 
annual deforestation rate in the northern and 
southern parts of the country was between 1.1% 
and 1.5%. In the central part of the country, the 
rate was 2.2%. The FCMP data reveal a similar 
average annual deforestation rate of 1.1% in the 
northern part of the country, but rates of 0.4%–
0.5% were seen for the central and southern parts 
between 1993 and 1997.
The data sets differ substantially for some 
individual provinces. The most striking differences 
are for the former Xaisomboun Special Zone and 
Oudomxay Province. For Xaisomboun, FIPD 
data record a deforestation rate of 5.5% between 
1992 and 2002, whereas FCMP data give a 0.1% 
rate between 1993 and 1997. For Oudomxay, 
according to FIPD sample data, forest cover 
increased by 2.3% each year from 1992 to 2002, 
whereas FCMP data show a deforestation rate of 
2.3% between 1993 and 1997. The differences 
between the data sets can be attributed to 
difficulties in distinguishing between forested and 
non-forested land because of the topography (steep 
terrain), as well as subjectivity of interpretation, 
seasonal changes in forest cover, the time lag 
between the data sets and the use of images with 
different resolutions (Watt 2010).
Table 4. Change in national forest cover, according to forest cover assessment by the Forest Inventory 
and Planning Division.
1982 1992 2002 2010a
Actual forest cover
(% of national territory)
49% 45% 41.5% 40%
Actual forest cover
(hectares)
11,637,000 11,168,000 9,825,000 9,500,000
a 2010 figures have not been officially validated
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Deforestation takes place not only in all three 
categories of state forest but also outside these 
areas. Data are insufficient to disaggregate the 
degraded area precisely into the categories. Official 
land concession inventories and research, however, 
have revealed that, in some cases, deforestation 
takes place inside conservation forests and national 
protected areas (NPAs) (Nanthavong et al. 2009; 
EIA 2011). This pattern indicates points that are 
highly relevant for REDD+ and equity: that most 
deforestation is taking place in areas managed 
by central state agencies and therefore that these 
state agencies could be the primary potential 
beneficiaries from REDD+. Moreover, because of 
poor data sets and lack of up-to-date information, 
it is difficult to ascertain the true REDD+ potential 
of Laos nationally. The unreliability of these data 
sets mean they are inadequate for determining 
baselines. This is an important gap.
2.1.4.2. Historical trends in forest degradation
In Laos’ R-PP, FIPD sample data, FCMP data, 
FIPD GIS data and National Forest Inventory data 
were used to determine historical trends in forest 
degradation (Watt 2010). The data sets use canopy 
closure classes to quantify the growing stock, and 
the reduction in growing stock is used to estimate 
forest degradation. The FIPD sample data and 
the FCMP data define well-stocked forests as 
having a canopy closure of more than 70%. FIPD 
sample data report a rapid decline in this canopy 
class from 3.2 million ha in 1992 to 840,000 ha 
in 2002. However, the FIPD GIS data for 2002 
and the FCMP data for 1997 suggest areas of 
1.57 million ha and 1.52 million ha, respectively, 
for this canopy closure class. The trends for 
medium-stocked and low-stocked canopy classes 
are even harder to interpret (Table 5): medium-
stocked forest shows a decline followed by a rapid 
increase, whereas the area of low-stocked forest 
increases, flattens and then declines.
Watt (2010) suggests that the FIPD sample data 
overestimate the area of well-stocked forest in 1992 
(29%), given that the FCMP data for 1993 and 
1997 report that well-stocked forest accounts for 
17% of the total forest area and the FIPD GIS data 
put the proportion of well-stocked forest at 15% in 
2002. Using the FIPD sample data, Watt (2010) 
calculated a volume-based forest degradation trend. 
According to those calculations, the decrease in 
volume between 1992 and 2002 represents an 
average annual decline of about 1.67% in stock in 
remaining forest or about 1.67 m3/ha/year. Using 
values from canopy density models, he observed a 
degradation rate of 0.6 m3/ha/year. The reference 
emission level (REL) model in the R-PP used 
an average rate of 1.12 m3/ha/year. Generally, 
estimates of the rate of forest degradation have 
a high level of uncertainty because they involve 
estimating an area with particular canopy closure 
classes (data with a high level of uncertainty) and 
assigning growing stock to each class (which has an 
unknown level of uncertainty).
Geographic differences in forest degradation 
trends can be deduced from geographic differences 
in timber harvesting and shifting cultivation. 
According to Thomas et al. (2010), commercial 
timber harvesting in the 1990s was most intensive 
in central and southern provinces, especially in 
Khammuane, Savannakhet and Bolikhamxay, for 
which they report log extraction of 420,000 m3 
in the 1998/1999 logging season. In the same 
logging season, log extraction amounted to 
4100 m3 in Luang Namtha, 704 m3 in Vientiane 
Municipality and 8300 m3 in Champasak. By 
Table 5. Forest degradation: Relative distribution of forest cover classes.
Year 1992 1993 1997 2002
Source FIPD sample FCMP FCMP FIPD sample FIPD GIS
% of 
national 
forest 
cover
Low stocked
(20–39%)
16% 30% 30% 29% 14%
Medium stocked
(40–69%)
55% 53% 53% 63% 71%
Well stocked
(>70%)
29% 17% 17% 8% 15%
 Source: Adapted from Watt (2010)
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contrast, according to Messerli et al. (2009), the 
heaviest levels of forest degradation caused by 
shifting cultivation occur in the northern uplands 
(Oudomxay, Luang Prabang and Huaphanh 
Provinces) and in parts of the Annamite 
Mountains on the eastern border with Vietnam 
(Savannakhet and Saravane Provinces).
Degraded forest is found in all three state forest 
categories, although data are insufficient to 
disaggregate the degraded area precisely into the 
categories. According to the R-PP (GoL 2010b), 
about 1.24 million ha (40%) of production forest 
areas (PFAs) are heavily degraded, but have the 
potential to recover and regrow under appropriate 
protection and management. The R-PP (GoL 
2010b) and the Forest Investment Program (FIP) 
(GoL 2011b) state that illegal logging is conducted 
in all state forest categories and in forests outside 
these categories. For example, officially contracted 
harvesting operators cut above the allowed 
quota in production forests or in infrastructure 
development sites, as well as in neighboring 
protection and conservation forests (cf. Baird 
2010b). In addition, local and foreign operators 
carry out large-scale illegal logging without any 
official harvesting contracts; these operators tend 
to target conservation forests (protected areas) 
and protection forests. Documented examples 
come from Xe Pian NPA (Baird 2010b), Nakai 
Nam Theun NPA (World Bank 2001) and other 
NPAs (EIA/Telapak 2008). Villagers also carry out 
small-scale illegal logging in all forest categories. 
According to the FIPD sample data for 1992 and 
2002, most degradation occurs in forests with 
70% or more canopy closure. However, studies 
differ over the locations of these forests. Whereas 
Watt (2010) assumes that they are more likely in 
conservation forests and NPAs, Hett et al. (2011b) 
claim that 70% of natural forests (i.e., primary 
forest with closed canopy) and the majority of the 
carbon stocks of these forests are found outside of 
the NPAs.
2.1.4.3. Projected trends in deforestation and 
forest degradation
To calculate the average annual emissions of CO2 
using baseline settings, Laos’ R-PP estimates the 
area affected by land clearance under a business-as-
usual scenario from 2010 to 2015 to be 67,000 ha 
per year (GoL 2010b). In the R-PP, this figure 
is broken down into commercial concessions 
(34,200 ha), smallholder cash crops (14,700 ha), 
hydropower projects (13,100 ha), mining projects 
(5100 ha) and infrastructure developments 
(2000 ha). According to the R-PP, another 
57,300 ha of forest will be degraded through 
shifting cultivation. Some of these estimates differ 
from those made by Watt (2010), who projects 
forest clearance of 14,100 ha/year for mining 
between 2010 and 2020 and 1000 ha/year for 
infrastructure development. Additional estimates 
are available from Stenhouse and Bojö (2011), 
who report that, as a result of government plans, 
up to 3% of the NPA is, or will be, flooded for 
hydropower, up to 5% of the NPA lies within 
mining concession areas and up to 2.4% of the 
NPA system may be used for mining.
Laos’ Fifth (2001–2005) and Sixth (2006–2010) 
National Socioeconomic Development Plans 
included tree planting, with plantation targets of 
134,000 ha by 2005 and an additional 25,000–
30,000 ha by 2010 (GoL 2001, 2006). The Sixth 
National Socioeconomic Development Plan (GoL 
2006) and the Forestry Strategy 2020 (GoL 2005a) 
set a target of 500,000 ha for the development 
of timber and rubber plantations. According to 
Laos’ Agricultural Development Strategy 2020, 
the Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry (MAF) 
envisages no more than 300,000 ha of company-
based rubber plantations nationwide (GoL 
2010a) — a threshold that has probably already 
been reached (GoL 2010b). In fact, anecdotal 
evidence suggests that the continued approval of 
additional concessions for plantation development 
could potentially lead to further deforestation 
(EIA 2012).
2.1.4.4. Historical trends in afforestation and 
reforestation
In 2009, Laos had approximately 300,000 ha of 
tree plantations, including 136,000 ha (46%) 
of rubber plantations (GoL 2009). By 2011, 
approximately 400,000 ha of rubber plantations 
and 300,000 ha of other industrial tree plantations 
had been established or were in the process of 
being developed (Barney 2011). In many instances, 
plantation development could be considered as 
deforestation because existing plantations had 
replaced natural forests (Nanthavong et al. 2009). 
According to the Sixth National Socioeconomic 
Development Plan and the Agriculture and 
Forestry Development Plan 2006–2010 (GoL 
2006), targets to be achieved by 2010 were 
53% forest cover through the rehabilitation 
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of 2.55 million ha of degraded forest and the 
establishment of 150,000 ha of forest plantations. 
Although the plantation target has been reached, 
there is no doubt that the 53% forest cover target 
and the 2.55 million ha rehabilitation target have 
not. In 2009, the government reported that, by 
2008, approximately 600,000 ha of forest had 
been restored (GoL 2009). Given that forest cover 
had decreased to 40% by 2010 (GoL 2011b), 
claims about these rehabilitation efforts appear 
questionable, especially as there are no reliable data 
on forest rehabilitation efforts or achievements on 
non-forested or degraded land.
The Forestry Strategy 2020 (GoL 2005a) set a 
target of planting trees in 500,000 ha of severely 
degraded (“unstocked”) forest areas and assumed 
that 6 million ha of forest would regenerate 
naturally. More generally, the government has 
committed to increasing the country’s forest 
cover to 65% by 2015 and to 70% by 2020 
(GoL 2005a, 2010d). Given that forest cover had 
decreased to 40% by 2010 and the failure of past 
rehabilitation efforts, this target does not appear 
feasible without major policy changes (Puustjaervi 
2011). Although afforestation, in the form of 
industrial timber plantations, is underway in areas 
already designated for that purpose, many of these 
plantations are established in forested areas, which 
means that they begin with deforestation. In the 
Industrial and Socioeconomic Development Plan 
for the Northern Provinces, the target for rubber 
plantations was reduced from 200,000 ha to 
150,000 ha (cf. Shi 2009) — a threshold that has 
presumably already been reached. It remains to be 
seen whether the government of Laos will stand 
by this self-imposed threshold or allow the further 
establishment of rubber plantations.
2.2. Main drivers of forest cover 
change
Although most scholars and studies cite logging 
and shifting cultivation as the two main drivers 
of deforestation and forest degradation in Laos, 
the country’s R-PP discusses nine drivers, which 
were identified during a study on land use and 
forest changes conducted in support of the R-PP 
(Thomas et al. 2010). The nine drivers are: (1) 
unsustainable wood extraction from production 
forest, (2) pioneering shifting cultivation, 
(3) agricultural expansion, (4) industrial 
tree plantation, (5) mining, (6) hydropower 
development, (7) infrastructure development, (8) 
fire and (9) urban expansion. The main drivers are 
analyzed below.
2.2.1. Unsustainable wood extraction from 
production forest 
Unsustainable wood extraction from production 
forest occurs in the form of commercial logging, 
logging for household purposes and illegal logging; 
wood extraction from conversion sites is dealt with 
separately. As it involves the extraction of selected 
timber species only, unsustainable wood extraction 
from production forest is a driver of forest 
degradation rather than of deforestation.
2.2.1.1. Commercial logging
Until the 1990s, Laos had no forest management 
system for commercial logging. Approximately 
2.5 million ha was officially designated as 
production forest but not mapped and the 
designation criteria were not made publicly 
available. Logging was carried out according 
to national logging quotas issued by the Prime 
Minister’s Office. Quotas were based not on 
sustainable forest management plans or forest 
inventories but rather on suggestions by various 
government authorities and members of the 
forestry and wood-processing industries; as a result, 
these suggestions reflected the industry’s demand 
for raw materials. The common understanding 
was that the forestry sector and revenue-generating 
forestry activities were underdeveloped. The main 
stakeholders involved in unsustainable wood 
extraction were the government authorities issuing 
the quotas, nine state forest enterprises, several 
provincial forest enterprises, private logging 
contractors and foreign donors that supported 
the government’s aim of increasing timber 
production. Following the 1986 New Economic 
Mechanism, which aimed at economic reform and 
liberalization, state forest enterprises and provincial 
forest enterprises were dissolved. At that time, the 
state forest enterprise concessions were basically 
logged out (cf. Barney 2011) and wood extraction 
moved into newly opened areas and areas of 
infrastructure development.
From 1991 onward, national logging quotas 
were lowered substantially within the framework 
of the Tropical Forest Action Plan. The main 
stakeholders involved in unsustainable wood 
extraction in this period were three military-
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run state-owned enterprises (SOEs) under the 
jurisdiction of the Ministry of Defense, which had 
gained control of the logging business. Although 
the central government was issuing national 
logging quotas, the SOEs’ logging activities evaded 
government control. In the late 1990s, central and 
provincial governments regained control over the 
SOEs (although the military continues to wield 
considerable influence in the forestry and logging 
sector, especially in border areas). Science-based, 
sustainability-oriented forest management was 
promoted through donor-supported projects from 
the 1990s onward. This shift is reflected in the 
1996 Forestry Law (GoL 1996), which allows 
wood extraction only in officially designated PFAs 
for which forest management plans are in place. 
At the same time, however, special logging quotas 
such as “district construction quotas”, “debt-
repayment quotas”, “development logging quotas” 
and “military logging quotas” were being issued at 
the local level (Baird 2010b).
Legal commercial logging in PFAs is not 
considered a major driver of deforestation because 
it is very limited. Most PFAs lack marketable 
tree species of minimum harvestable diameter 
and the timber market is not interested in lesser 
used tree species (cf. Thomas et al. 2010). During 
the 1990s, official extraction of logs from PFAs 
ranged between 120,000 m3 and 340,000 m3 per 
year, accounting for 23.3%–73.8% of the overall 
log extraction (Table 6). Since 2000, quotas for 
commercial wood extraction from production 
forests have been reduced. For example, the 
logging quota for the 2008/2009 season was 
150,000 m3, but less than 86,000 m3 was reported 
to have been harvested (GoL 2009). Often, 
however, the quotas have not been adhered to. 
According to some reports, actual logging in 
PFAs exceeds official quotas because of additional 
quotas issued locally or corrupt practices that 
inflate quotas (World Bank 2001; Baird 2010b). 
Sometimes, actual logging in PFAs remains below 
official quotas because of bad weather or the 
preference of logging companies to log in areas that 
are easier to convert to other uses (cf. GoL 2009; 
Baird 2010b). Therefore, accurately estimating 
timber extraction from PFAs is often not possible.
2.2.1.2. Logging for household consumption
Although the government of Laos concedes that 
wood extraction for household consumption is 
poorly regulated, it has less of an effect on forest 
degradation than other drivers (GoL 2010b). 
Thomas et al. (2010) estimate that logging for 
household consumption has increased in line with 
population growth, from about 630,000 m3/year 
(1992–2002) to 770,000 m3/year (2002–2009). 
According to the National Population and 
Housing Census of 2005, 80% of households use 
firewood as their main source of energy for cooking 
(Messerli et al. 2008). Estimates for firewood 
extraction vary substantially, ranging from 
1.5 million m3 to 8 million m3 per year (cf. World 
Bank 2001; Phiathep 2002). Firewood is often 
collected from shifting cultivation areas during site 
preparation (Thomas et al. 2010). However, there 
is no reliable information on how much firewood 
is taken from secondary forest or fallows, thus 
contributing to forest degradation.
2.2.1.3. Illegal logging
Accurate and reliable information on the extent 
of illegal logging in Laos is not available, but 
the government concedes that “wood extraction 
has actually increased in recent years as a result 
of increased illegal logging”; it considers illegal 
logging a serious problem and the main driver of 
forest degradation (GoL 2010b). According to the 
R-PP (GoL 2010b), the growing stock of Laos’ 
forests has fallen by an average of 18 million m3 
per year during the past 20 years; official forest 
clearance and timber harvesting account for only 
about 10 million m3 per year, with the remaining 
8 million m3 per year not accounted for. The R-PP 
further estimates that 5000 trees (or 12,500 m3) 
Table 6. Official wood extraction from 
production forests, 1990–1999.
Year m3
% of overall log 
extraction
1990 220,000 73.8
1991 200,000 51.2
1992 120,000 61.5
1993 340,000 66.7
1994 150,000 25.3
1995 204,000 23.3
1996 263,000 39.9
1997 170,000 30.4
1998 257,000 55.3
1999 319,000 43.5
Source: World Bank (2001)
12 | Lestrelin G, Trockenbrodt M, Phanvilay K, Thongmanivong S, Vongvisouk T, Pham TT and Castella J-C. 
are illegally harvested each year in a typical district. 
Several estimates or observations support the 
notion that illegal logging is substantial. One 
report (Anonymous 2000), for instance, puts the 
amount of timber illegally logged at 100,000 m3 
per year, and EIA (2009) reports that 600,000 m3 
is smuggled into Vietnam each year.
As the legal framework for Laos’ forestry sector 
has numerous discrepancies, it is often difficult to 
determine whether logging activities are legal or 
illegal. Article 49 of the Forestry Law states: “The 
government allows logging and harvesting of forest 
products only in the production forest areas where 
inventory, surveys and sustainable management 
plans have been completed and only in the areas 
that the government permits the construction of 
infrastructure”. It has been argued that, under 
this definition, nearly all wood extraction from 
areas other than infrastructure development sites 
is illegal, because, as of 2010, sustainable forest 
management plans had been developed for only 
six of the 51 PFAs supported by the Sustainable 
Forestry for Rural Development (SUFORD) 
project funded by the World Bank and the 
government of Finland (Barney and Canby 2011). 
However, local or central government authorities 
often grant logging licenses in violation of the law 
(Bestari et al. 2006).
An array of agents are involved in illegal logging, 
among them domestic and foreign companies and 
individual business operators, the military, local 
people and government officials (GoL 2010b). 
Vietnamese and Lao companies are reportedly 
involved in illegal logging in hydropower 
development sites in the south of the country 
(EIA 2011). Often local people or contractors are 
hired to carry out the actual logging, with local 
authorities or the military providing support (Baird 
2011). Overall, however, unsustainable wood 
extraction through illegal logging is the result of a 
complex web of direct and indirect drivers. Laos 
has long been characterized by a centrally planned 
economy (cf. UNIDO 2003) and its standard 
planning instruments include 5-year plans, growth 
objectives, production plans and targeted sector 
priorities (cf. GoL 2006, 2010d). This political 
model and a pressing need for economic growth 
led to the overambitious development of the 
wood-processing industry with a demand for raw 
material that far exceeded the sustainable supply 
from natural forests (Frazer et al. 2009). At the 
same time, Laos’ neighbors — especially Vietnam 
— have developed massive, partly export-oriented 
wood-processing industries, thus driving up 
demand for raw materials from Laos (Forest 
Trends/DFID 2010). The high demand for raw 
material in turn drove up timber prices, boosting 
the already high profits of logging operations 
(Forest Trends/DFID 2010). The combination 
of insufficient financial resources allocated from 
the state budget to forestry departments and 
inadequate training of forestry officials led to low 
capacity among forest authorities and thus weak 
control and monitoring of the forestry sector. 
Furthermore, the combination of poor regulation 
of natural resources and extremely low salaries 
for forestry officials weakened governance and 
led to ample opportunities for rent seeking and 
corruption in the forestry sector (Baird 2011).
2.2.2. Pioneering shifting cultivation
Rural households, which account for 69% of 
Laos’ population, practice shifting cultivation 
(GoL 2012) in their pursuit of income and food 
security. Past (pioneering) shifting cultivation 
has presumably transformed large areas of mature 
forest into rotational shifting cultivation areas 
consisting of a mosaic of fallows (secondary 
forests) and land under crop, thus contributing 
to deforestation and forest degradation. It has 
been estimated that, at the end of the 1980s, 
pioneering and rotational shifting cultivation 
covered about 4,864,000 ha, of which 310,000–
600,000 ha were cultivated areas and the rest 
was fallow forest (Chazee 1994). According to 
the government (GoL 2005b), the total area 
of shifting cultivation remained more or less 
constant between 1982 and 2002. However, 
the area under cultivation increased nationwide 
from 597,400 ha in 1982 to 625,700 ha in 
1992, although it had decreased to 516,900 ha 
by 2002. According to the Forest Strategy 2020 
(GoL 2005a), between 1992 and 2002 pioneering 
shifting cultivation was a key cause of forest 
cover loss in the country’s north. However, other 
reports suggest that pioneering shifting cultivation 
declined from 180,000 ha in 1994/1995 to 
119,000 ha in 2001/2002 to 29,400 ha in 2005 
(Thomas et al. 2010). Evidence from a case study 
in northern Laos supports this decrease, as it 
found that no pioneering shifting cultivation 
occurred in the study area between 2007 and 
2009 (Hett et al. 2011a).
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Shifting cultivation has long been cited as a major 
cause of deforestation and forest degradation in 
Laos, both by the government and by some donors 
(cf. Souvanthong 1995; GoL 2005a). Shifting 
cultivation, as a cause of deforestation or forest 
degradation, was widespread in areas declared 
conservation forest when National Biodiversity 
Conservation Areas were established in 1993; this 
network was converted into the NPA system in 
2000. Although rotational shifting cultivation 
remains an important proximate driver of forest 
degradation in many of these areas (see Robichaud 
et al. 2009; Hett et al. 2011), some NPAs 
have managed to reduce the encroachment by 
shifting cultivation by large amounts (Moore et 
al. 2011). As described by Castella et al. (2013), 
this reduction has often been achieved through 
a combination of village resettlements, village 
boundary delineation and strengthened law 
enforcement with the support of international 
conservation organizations such as the Wildlife 
Conservation Society (WCS) and WWF. 
However, others have asserted that international 
organizations cannot claim credit for this reduction 
because it has also been observed outside the 
NPA; indeed, it is more likely attributable to 
the images selected for the feasibility study and 
not to improved NPA management (personal 
communication from Moore, 2013).
The government introduced several policies 
aimed at eradicating or at least stabilizing shifting 
cultivation to begin a shift toward permanent 
agriculture; these include the Shifting Cultivation 
Stabilization Program (Prime Ministerial Decree 
No. 117/1989), MAF Instruction No. 1220, 
and the Land and Forest Allocation Program 
(MAF Instruction No. 822). It is now believed 
that shifting cultivation has not played a key 
role in large-scale deforestation since the middle 
of the 20th century and that rotational shifting 
cultivation is in fact a sustainable land-use system 
that does not induce further deforestation as long 
as population pressures or other influences do 
not reduce the area available for cultivation (e.g., 
Fox 2000; GoL 2005a). Local studies from Laos 
support this view (e.g., Robichaud et al. 2009).
Pioneering shifting cultivation does drive 
deforestation in areas with insufficient land or 
land access for rotational shifting cultivation 
because of population increase or loss of land. 
In Laos, local populations may grow because 
of voluntary or forced resettlement included in 
government policies, such as the NPA system and 
the Shifting Cultivation Stabilization Program, 
or government-supported economic measures 
such as the development of large-scale plantation 
concessions or the construction of hydropower 
dams. Factors in such developments are insecure 
land tenure or even loss of land, for example due to 
the establishment of plantation concessions.
2.2.3. Industrial tree plantations
Tree plantations are developed as medium- to 
large-scale investments in concessions on leased 
land as well as small-scale investments and 
household-based plantations, mainly on private 
land. As of 2011, approximately 300,000 ha of 
industrial tree plantations had been established or 
were being planned or developed (Barney 2011). 
According to the Forestry Law (GoL 2007b), 
industrial tree plantations can be developed only 
on degraded or barren land. However, given ample 
evidence that industrial tree plantations are often 
established on forested land (Nanthavong et al. 
2009; Thomas et al. 2010; Barney 2011), the 
government considers industrial tree plantation 
development to be a major driver of deforestation 
(GoL 2010b).
An analysis of land-use change in Laos (Thomas 
et al. 2010) identified the following key factors 
contributing to deforestation through the 
development of industrial tree plantations:
•	 weak enforcement of laws, regulations and 
concession agreements by local authorities 
because of low human and technical capacity 
and limited financial resources
•	 inappropriate or nonexistent land-use planning, 
insecure land tenure and minimal awareness 
among resource users of their rights to use land 
and forest resources
•	 absence of economic incentives that could help 
make the management and protection of forests 
competitive (economically attractive) compared 
with other land uses.
Barney (2011) analyzes and illustrates in detail 
many of these drivers and causes using the example 
of industrial timber plantations developed for 
pulpwood by international companies. Between 
2000 and 2010, the demand for pulpwood 
rose sharply in many countries. In China, for 
example, the Chinese government and financial 
sector responded by backing an increase in pulp-
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manufacturing capacity. This growth raised interest 
in Laos as a supplier of plantation timber, inducing 
some key players to invest in pulpwood plantations. 
This process was initially supported by the Asian 
Development Bank (ADB) and officials at various 
levels of the government of Laos allocated concession 
areas for these investments, often without sufficient 
consideration of the impacts on existing forest cover.
2.2.4. Agricultural expansion
Information on the actual extent of the expansion 
of cash crops is limited. Thomas et al. (2010) 
report that the area used for cash crops, such 
as maize, coffee, vegetables and fruit, increased 
from 17,700 ha in 1992 to around 320,000 ha 
in 2006; yet another estimate (UNDP 2010) is 
that 3.5 million ha or 14.7% of the country’s land 
area is under agribusiness concession agreements 
or contracts. During the past 20 years, especially 
between 2002 and 2009, agricultural expansion 
has been a major driver of deforestation in Laos, 
following the substantial increase in the number 
of large and small agricultural concessions and 
household farming (Thomas et al. 2010; GoL 
2010b). Stibig et al. (2007) describe the conversion 
from forest to cash crops (including rubber) as 
the “most important cause of forest loss” in Laos. 
More detailed information might become available 
shortly from the Second Agricultural Census, which 
was being evaluated at the time of writing this 
report. The immediate and underlying causes of 
deforestation associated with large-scale commercial 
agriculture are similar to those described above 
for timber plantation development. Deforestation 
through agricultural expansion on a smaller scale is 
driven by smallholders who expand their permanent 
plantations of cash crops. This livelihood strategy 
is influenced by favorable site conditions such 
as soil fertility, which promise high productivity 
and profitability, as well as by market forces such 
as domestic demand or demand in neighboring 
countries.
2.2.5. Mining
The government views mining as a key sector for 
economic development (GoL 2010d) and mining 
activities in Laos are expected to increase (GoL 
2010b). In October 2008, 213 mining projects 
were registered in Laos (Kyophilvong 2009). In 
2011, copper and gold were the most important 
mineral resources exploited. Others include bauxite 
and lignite/coal, and bauxite deposits have been 
explored on the Boloven Plateau in the country’s 
south. According to Stenhouse and Bojö (2011), one 
company has been granted a production agreement, 
and seven companies are in the prospecting 
stage. Open-cast bauxite mining would lead to 
deforestation of large areas. Stenhouse and Bojö 
(2011) estimate that mining concessions have been 
issued for 5% of the NPA (e.g., in Nam Et-Phou 
Loey NPA) and that up to 2.4% of these areas 
may be exploited for mining. Exact information 
on the areas deforested by mining operations is not 
available, but operations such as the Sepon Gold-
Copper Operation Project in Savannakhet Province, 
the Phu Kham Copper-Gold Mining Project in 
Vientiane Province and the Hongsa Lignite Project 
in Xayaboury Province cover extensive areas. 
According to the R-PP (GoL 2010), 5100 ha of 
forest will be cleared each year for mining activities.
In October 2008, 85 foreign companies were 
active (48 Chinese, 19 Vietnamese, six Thai, four 
Australian, two Russian, two North Korean, two 
Canadian, one South Korean, one Polish) and 42 
domestic mining companies were active. Forty 
projects were in the prospecting stage, 85 in the 
exploration stage, seven in the feasibility study stage 
and 46 in the mining stage (Kyophilvong 2009). Of 
the 35 active mines in 2006, 13 were managed by 
government departments (Ministry of Energy and 
Mines: seven; Ministry of Defense: five; Ministry 
of Industry and Commerce: one) and more than 
10 by foreign investors (six Chinese, three Thai, 
two Vietnamese, two Australian). The large-scale 
Sepon Gold-Copper Operation Project and the Phu 
Kham Copper-Gold Mining Project were operated 
by Australian companies, although ownership 
of Sepon was transferred to Chinese investors in 
2011. According to Kyophilvong (2009), domestic 
companies and companies from neighboring 
countries carry out smaller mining operations with 
little consideration for environmental impacts. 
Mining is motivated by high profitability, abundant 
market opportunities and government investment 
incentives, and facilitated by weak governance 
(especially over approvals of concessions) and weak 
enforcement of forestry and environmental laws.
2.2.6. Hydropower development
The government of Laos is pursuing the 
development of hydropower relentlessly as one of 
the main pillars of the country’s economic growth. 
The Seventh National Socioeconomic Development 
Plan (GoL 2010d) sets out plans to build 10 large 
dams with a combined capacity of more than 
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5000 MW. According to the Department of Energy 
Promotion and Development under the Ministry of 
Energy and Mines (GoL 2011c), 14 projects were 
operating and nine were under construction in July 
2011. Some of these projects are of considerable size, 
such as the operational 1075 MW Nam Theun 2 
project and the 1285 MW Xayaboury project, under 
construction since 2011. According to Stenhouse 
and Bojö (2011), at least six of the hydropower 
projects that are operational or under construction as 
well as 12 potential hydropower projects are located 
in NPAs; in total this means that 3% of the NPA is 
or could be used for hydropower. The development 
of hydropower thus led directly to the annual 
deforestation of 6000–15,000 ha between 2006 
and 2010 (Watt 2010). Furthermore, hydropower 
indirectly leads to further deforestation and forest 
degradation as logging operators often illegally 
extend the range of their logging operations into 
areas surrounding the construction sites (Thomas et 
al. 2010; EIA 2011). In addition, the resettlements 
that usually accompany hydropower projects 
intensify pressure on forests at the resettlement 
sites because of the increase in population density 
(Thomas et al. 2010). The main stakeholders in 
hydropower development are the government and 
major international financial institutions such as 
the World Bank and the ADB, which share the 
common vision of using hydropower development as 
a strategic pillar for increasing government revenues 
and developing poor regions. The concessionaires are 
the state-owned company Electricité du Laos (EDL) 
and companies from China, Thailand, Norway, 
Malaysia, Russia, France and Vietnam that form 
joint ventures with the national government.
2.2.7. Infrastructure development and urban 
expansion
Compared with hydropower development, 
infrastructure development is a relatively minor 
direct driver of deforestation, with approximately 
2000 ha affected annually (Watt 2010). Indirectly, 
however, it can have a major effect on forest 
degradation because it opens up previously 
inaccessible areas. Examples of urban development 
are the growth of Vientiane and the relocation 
of the provincial capital of Phongsaly, and road 
upgrading and urban development work within and 
around the Nam Et-Phou Loey NPA. From 1992 
to 2002, urban areas expanded from approximately 
84,000 ha to 135,000 ha (cf. Thomas et al. 2010), 
that is, an average of 5000 ha per year. Recent exact 
information on the extent of urban expansion is not 
available. Data on wood extraction from conversion 
sites between 1990 and 1999 are given in Table 7, 
which shows that between 26% and 77% (average 
53%) of annual wood extracted is taken from 
conversion sites, especially hydropower sites.
2.2.8. Fire
Vegetation fires occur frequently in Laos, mainly 
at the end of the dry season between February and 
April. The number of fires detected by the MODIS 
instruments on satellites each year ranges from 
20,000 fires in 2002 and 2008 to 50,000 fires in 
2010 (Müller and Suess 2011). In 2010, about 
18% (>4 million ha) of the land area of Laos was 
affected by these fires (Müller and Suess 2011). Fires 
are usually part of forest change activities such as 
conversion to croplands (shifting cultivation) or to 
plantations. They are also lit to encourage the growth 
of new grass for cattle fodder or for hunting. Fires 
often escape because they are left unattended and 
continue to spread uncontrolled for long periods. 
The Forest Strategy 2020 (GoL 2005a) names fire as 
one of the two main drivers of forest degradation in 
Laos (shifting cultivation being the other), especially 
in the north of the country. Stibig et al. (2007) claim 
that fire is not a driver of deforestation in Laos, 
although it might contribute to degradation, and 
Thomas et al. (2010) indicate that the impact of fire 
on forest degradation is “very low”. Nevertheless, fire 
is included as one of the nine drivers of deforestation 
and forest degradation by Thomas et al. (2010) and 
in Laos’ R-PP (GoL 2010b). However, this driver 
receives little attention in analyses and documents. 
Table 7. Wood extraction from conversion sites, 
1990–1999.
Year m3
% of overall log 
extraction
1990 78,000 26.2
1991 190,000 48.8
1992 75,000 38.4
1993 170,000 33.3
1994 444,000 74.7
1995 670,000 76.7
1996 396,000 60.1
1997 389,000 69.6
1998 208,000 44.7
1999 415,000 56.5
Source: World Bank (2001)
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2.3. Mitigation potential
In the course of developing Laos’ R-PP, Watt 
(2010) created a model for estimating the sources 
and magnitudes of emissions from land use, land-
use change and forestry (LULUCF). This model 
was used to estimate the average yearly emissions 
of CO2 from each driver between 1982 and 2002 
and to project future emissions to 2020. The 
results are presented in the R-PP (GoL 2010b) 
and the FIP (GoL 2011b) and are reproduced here 
in Figure 2 and Table 8. The model calculations 
show a historical decline in annual emissions 
from 1982 (95.3 million tCO2e) to 2010 
(60.6 million tCO2e). The decline is interpreted as 
a result of a reduction in the remaining growing 
stock of 1.12% per year (Watt 2010).
For 2012–2020, the total volume of annual 
emissions from deforestation and forest 
degradation was estimated at approximately 
51 million tons CO2. Deforestation and forest 
degradation each contribute about half of the total, 
with the expansion of concessions identified as the 
main source.
2.3.1. Hydropower and mining
Approximately 5.3% of the total emissions 
from LULUCF (2.5 million tons of CO2) come 
from hydropower and mining. Carbon-sensitive 
planning, which requires the developer to take 
carbon stocks into consideration, to factor them 
into financial calculations and to avoid unnecessary 
deforestation, offers an opportunity to reduce these 
emissions. Furthermore, biomass removals from 
Figure 2. Modeled reference emission levels and 
projected trend.
Source: GoL (2010a, 2010b)
-120.0
-100.0
-80.0
-60.0
Em
is
si
on
s 
(m
ill
 t 
CO
2-
e)
Year
-40.0
-20.0
1982
1984
1986
1988
1990
1992
1994
1996
1998
2000
2002
2004
2006
2008
2010
2012
2014
2016
2018
0.0
Development Trend
REL
Table 8. Estimate of average yearly emissions of CO
2
, 2012–2020, using baselines.
Total annual emissions 
Average annual 
area affected 
(‘000 ha) 
Average annual 
emissions 
(million tCO
2
e) 
Percentage of 
total emissions 
of CO
2
 
Total annual emissions from C stock change in natural 
forests 
–46.84 100.0% 
Total annual emissions from rotational shifting 
cultivation 
57.3 –9.95 21.25% 
Total annual emissions from land clearance 67.2 –9.28 19.82% 
Of which: Commercial concessions 34.2 –4.72 10.08% 
Smallholder cash crops 14.7 –2.02 4.32% 
Hydropower 13.1 –1.81 3.87% 
Mining 5.1 –0.70 1.50% 
Infrastructure 0.2 –0.02 0.05% 
Total annual emissions from forest degradation (wood 
extraction)
9,776.7 –23.34 49.83% 
Total annual net emissions of sequestration plantations 67.2 –4.26 9.10% 
Total annual net emissions (adjusted for sequestration) –51.10 
Source: GoL (2011a)
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potential hydropower reservoirs have to be planned 
and executed with greater care.
2.3.2. Industrial tree plantations and cash 
crops
Conversion of forest to plantations and smallholder 
cash crops contributes approximately 40% of the 
total emissions from LULUCF, making it the main 
contributor of CO2 emissions from deforestation in 
Laos. The bulk of the mitigation potential therefore 
lies in preventing further loss of forest with high 
crown cover. This will require the enforcement of 
existing requirements to develop these concessions 
only on barren or severely degraded land with less 
than 20% crown cover, through better land-use 
planning, incorporation of carbon values into land 
values and strict law enforcement. Conversion of 
forest by smallholders, which affects 14,700 ha 
per year (GoL 2010b), could be reduced through 
better land-use planning and improved agricultural 
production techniques.
2.3.3. Unsustainable wood extraction
Unsustainable wood extraction is the main source 
of emissions from forest degradation, which 
accounts for close to 50% of the emissions from 
LULUCF (23 million tons of CO2). Only 14% of 
PFAs are managed according to accepted standards 
for participatory sustainable forest management, 
such as that of the Forest Stewardship Council. 
Implementing sustainable forest management in 
all PFAs, which involves the delineation of forest 
boundaries, the participation of local communities 
in forest protection and the introduction of 
reduced impact logging, would lead to a reduction 
in emissions. Stopping illegal logging through 
more effective governance and law enforcement 
is also essential. The FIP (GoL 2011b) lists four 
approaches to achieving this: 
•	 Enforce the provision in the Forestry Law that 
allows harvesting only in protected forest areas 
that have sustainable management plans and 
tighten controls on harvesting in infrastructure 
development areas.
•	 Enforce the Forestry Law requirement that 
all harvesting machinery and equipment be 
registered and ensure that harvesting capacity 
meets approved quotas.
•	 Analyze and monitor wood consumption to 
compare it with the harvest production officially 
allowed under participatory sustainable forest 
management and closely monitor all special 
licenses for clearance for infrastructure projects. 
The difference will be the volume harvested 
illegally.
•	 Conduct monitoring and surveillance of forest 
areas to detect illegal logging, which can be 
extremely difficult because of the size of the area 
to be covered and its low accessibility.
2.3.4. Shifting cultivation
Reducing emissions from shifting cultivation 
will require the introduction of suitable 
alternative livelihood options that contribute to 
food security and poverty reduction to replace 
shifting cultivation. Introducing new livelihood 
sources will require improved extension services. 
Similar efforts have been made in the past with 
projects trying to develop or improve agricultural 
production and sustainable farming systems. 
Options to support these activities include 
improvement of water supply, health, sanitation, 
education and communication facilities, as well as 
savings and credit schemes at the community level. 
Furthermore, the capacity of local government 
and village institutions has to be strengthened. At 
the same time, the pressure that leads to shortened 
fallow cycles in rotational shifting cultivation areas 
has to be decreased, as longer cycles help ensure 
the sustainability of rotational shifting cultivation 
areas. Achieving this will require that government 
policies be reassessed and adjusted. Current 
efforts to develop communal land titling could 
assist in the shift away from overly restrictive land 
regulation (e.g., the “three plots per household” 
policy; see Section 4.1) and give farmers greater 
flexibility in pursuing extensive forms of shifting 
cultivation.
3 Institutional environment and 
distributional aspects
3.1. Governance in the forest margins
3.1.1. Global governance and international 
agreements
Laos is not a member of the International 
Timber Trade Organization, and neither has it 
been prominent in the United Nations Forum 
on Forests (UNFF). However, as a member of 
the Association of South-East Asian Nations 
(ASEAN), it has contributed to the design 
of regional strategies communicated during 
UNFF meetings, such as the ASEAN work 
plan 2008–2015 for Strengthening Forest Law 
Enforcement and Governance (FLEG) and the 
ASEAN common position paper on Reducing 
Emissions from Deforestation and Forest 
Degradation (REDD+) in Developing Countries 
(2008). Following the Bali Declaration in 2007, 
government representatives attended meetings 
for the East Asia and Pacific FLEG initiative. 
Representatives from MAF have also participated 
in information meetings for the European Union 
Forest Law Enforcement, Governance and Trade 
(EU FLEGT) Action Plan (Vientiane Times 
2012a). More recently, representatives from MAF, 
the Ministry of Planning and Investment and the 
German Agency for International Cooperation 
(GIZ) have discussed the funding and design of 
a joint project to support the development of a 
FLEGT Voluntary Partnership Agreement between 
Laos and the EU (Vientiane Times 2012b). With 
regard to international trade, the terms of Laos’ 
membership in the World Trade Organization 
(WTO) were agreed in September 2012 (WTO 
2011) and the country has been an official WTO 
member since February 2013. The government of 
Laos has ratified the following major international 
agreements on biodiversity, wildlife and protection 
of the natural resources:
•	 United Nations Framework Convention on 
Climate Change (UNFCCC) in 1995
•	 United Nations Convention on Biological 
Diversity (CBD) in 1996
•	 Convention on International Trade in 
Endangered Species (CITES) in 2004
•	 Ramsar Convention on wetlands, with two sites 
registered in 2010.
As for bilateral agreements, the government of 
Laos and the Forest Protection Department of 
Vietnam signed a Memorandum of Understanding 
dealing with law enforcement and the prevention 
of illegal timber trade in 2009. This initiative has 
been described as a response to high-profile reports 
by international NGOs (e.g., EIA/Telapak 2008) 
about the magnitude of illegal timber extraction in 
Laos and related trade with the Vietnamese wood-
processing industry (Lawson and MacFaul 2010; 
World Bank 2011a). However, as recent studies 
have shown, this agreement has had little impact 
on the illegal cross-border timber trade (Forest 
Trends 2010; EIA 2011, 2012). More generally, 
forestry law enforcement and the implementation 
of the major international agreements listed 
above tend to be heavily constrained by the 
limited capacity and resources within relevant 
departments, legal uncertainties allowing for 
exceptions (e.g., special logging quotas issued by 
central and subnational governments despite a 
national ban on the export of roundwood in place 
since 2007) and the persistence of discretionary 
practices and collusion between officials and 
private sector actors (World Bank 2005, 2011a; 
Bestari et al. 2006; Forest Trends 2010; Pescott et 
al. 2010; EIA 2011).
3.1.2. Governance in areas under high threat 
of deforestation and forest degradation
Deforestation and forest degradation in Laos are 
generally considered to result from two main sets 
of drivers: first, strong pressure from the private 
sector to gain access to the country’s land and 
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natural wealth, leading to high rates of land and 
logging concession grants, rapid forest conversion 
and unsustainable timber extraction; second, high 
poverty rates and growing population densities in 
rural areas, leading to uncontrolled agricultural 
expansion, forest conversion and overharvesting 
of forest resources (GoL 2005a, 2010a; World 
Bank 2005).
In response to the increasing pressure on natural 
resources in Laos, there has been tremendous 
development of legislation and procedures in 
land-use planning and forestry in recent years. 
For instance, the 1996 Forestry Law was revised 
in 2007 to limit the authority of provincial and 
district governments to grant licenses over large 
areas of forest land and establish concessions. 
The revised law created a Department of Forest 
Inspection within MAF, authorizing it to regulate 
activities in the forestry sector and file charges 
against offenders (GoL 2007a). Furthermore, the 
Prime Minister imposed a moratorium on large-
scale land concessions for private investments 
(i.e., mining, hydropower, plantations, etc.) 
in response to growing concerns about the 
negative socioeconomic and ecological impacts 
of “land grabbing” by private investors and the 
low government revenues derived from these 
concessions (Dwyer 2007). Significant changes 
were also introduced into the broader land-
use planning system with the introduction of 
Participatory Land Use Planning (PLUP) at the 
village cluster level (MAF and NLMA 2009), 
National and Provincial Land Use Master 
Plans (GoL 2010b) and Northern/Southern 
Development Plans (Shi 2009), all aimed at least in 
part at addressing issues related to concessions and 
agricultural expansion; for example, instruments 
defined forest conservation areas, identified land 
available for industrial development or introduced 
communal land registration as a tool to prevent 
large-scale land seizures.
Although such developments represent a move 
toward improved land and forest governance, 
they have brought in multiple actors and 
duplicate rules for managing natural resources. 
The result is conflicting legal provisions, unclear 
and overlapping mandates, lack of coordination 
among actors, and inconsistent implementation of 
plans and regulations across the national territory 
(GoL 2008; Lestrelin et al. 2012). For example, 
despite its extension in 2009, the moratorium on 
concessions has not been fully enforced because 
of legal exceptions and loopholes (Kenney-Lazar 
2010). Given the persistent lack of resources 
and insufficient capacity for law enforcement 
and monitoring at the subnational level, the 
government of Laos will face major challenges in 
any program to reduce deforestation and forest 
degradation.
There are two key weaknesses in forest governance 
in Laos. First, ambiguities and uncertainties in 
rules and processes in land-use planning and 
land allocation create opportunities for unsound 
resource-use practices. Over the past decade, 
private investors (both domestic and foreign) 
have negotiated with central and subnational 
government bodies and signed medium- to 
large-scale concession agreements, even though 
most of these types of operations have proved to 
be unrealistic at the local level. Reports suggest 
that there have been cases where concessions 
were allocated to multiple investors and where 
local people were excluded from their land, thus 
experiencing severe impacts on their livelihoods 
(GoL 2005a; Baird 2010a; Barney 2010; 
Kenney-Lazar 2010; Dwyer 2011). In some of 
the reported instances, unscrupulous operators 
who gained concession rights took advantage of 
the limited presence of forestry departments at 
the local level, for example by ignoring agreed 
concession development plans and/or engaging in 
corruption and timber smuggling (EIA/Telapak 
2008; Sipaseuth and Hunt 2009; Baird 2010a, 
2010b; EIA 2011). Although most cases reported 
to date were in southern Laos, most notably 
Attapeu, Champasak and Bolikhamxay Provinces, 
concerns are growing about booming Chinese 
agribusiness investments in the north (Dwyer 
2007; TNI 2010).
Closely related to the first weakness are the weak 
governance and poor law enforcement capacity, 
which not only create loopholes for large-scale 
industrial projects but also leave the way open 
for smallholder farmers and small-scale logging 
operators to encroach upon protected and 
production forests. The penalty system appears 
inefficient and poorly suited to local situations. On 
the one hand, in most upland areas characterized 
by widespread poverty and predominantly 
subsistence agriculture (Rigg 2005), fines tend 
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to be an ineffective and even harmful instrument 
because of offenders’ inability to pay. On the 
other hand, in areas where smallholders have had 
opportunities to develop commercial agriculture, 
fines tend to be considered merely as the price 
that the emerging class of farming entrepreneurs 
must pay to gain access to land (Ducourtieux et 
al. 2005).
The weak governance and mismanagement of 
forest resources can be partly explained by the 
minimal local participation in land-use planning 
and negotiations of land concession agreements. 
In the first instance, local populations’ limited 
access to information and lack of planning 
experience, poor facilitation capacities of district 
land-use planners, and absence of follow-up 
incentives for monitoring and extension converge 
to impede local negotiation, understanding and 
implementation of the plans (Lestrelin et al. 2011). 
In the second instance, the presence of powerful 
private interests often results in deals agreed and 
signed between high-level government officials and 
private investors, with little or no input from local 
populations (Baird 2010a; Barney 2010; Kenney-
Lazar 2010), or in unmediated, direct negotiations 
between investors and local populations, with 
major risks of elite capture and/or manipulation 
by investors (Haberecht 2009; Phimmavong et al. 
2009; Sipaseuth and Hunt 2009).
Although newly emerging civil society groups 
in Laos are starting to address issues on resource 
governance, their capacity remains nascent. 
Laos was virtually devoid of civil society before 
the mid-2000s. The creation of the Lao Union 
of Science and Engineering Associations in 
2001 prompted the emergence of nonprofit 
organizations in the fields of rural development 
and environmental governance, such as the Lao 
Biodiversity Association and the Community 
Development and Environment Association. 
However, these organizations retain close ties with 
ministries and other government bodies. Most of 
these organizations are run by senior government 
officials. In 2009, Prime Ministerial Decree No. 
115 officially recognized these organizations as 
local NGOs, and about 50 local NGOs were 
registered with the Lao Non-Profit Associations 
Network in 2010. Many of these NGOs are 
partners with both government and international 
development agencies. They are also beginning to 
influence land and forest governance, including 
through working groups such as the “Land issues” 
group, “Micro–macroeconomic linkages” group 
and “Mak Phet”. Although these organizations 
are not entirely grassroots initiatives, as they are 
closely monitored by the government, they are 
increasingly active in putting land issues from 
across the country onto the national agenda, and 
play an active role in prompting changes in land 
and forestry institutions, especially with regard to 
securing land tenure and introducing collective 
land titling at the village level (Sipaseuth and 
Hunt 2009).
3.2. Implications for REDD+
This context of weak governance and heavy 
pressure on land and forest resources has major 
implications for the future of REDD+ in Laos. 
First, to be both effective and efficient, REDD+ 
will require considerable investments in capacity 
building for administrative and technical staff, 
especially at subnational levels. Second, significant 
technical and organizational investment will be 
needed to clarify and harmonize land-use planning 
and land allocation and to enhance monitoring 
and law enforcement in areas under high threat 
of deforestation and forest degradation. Building 
upon current momentum within ASEAN, some of 
these challenges could be addressed by designing 
complementary REDD+ and FLEG or FLEGT 
initiatives (Proforest 2011). As Laos is not among 
the EU’s major direct timber trade partners, there 
are probably better, shorter-term prospects for 
FLEG agreements within the ASEAN framework; 
these should probably be prioritized. Ensuring 
equity and co-benefits such as poverty reduction 
and political representation will also require a 
greater role for civil society, and, importantly, 
facilitating the emergence of grassroots initiatives 
and setting up a grievance mechanism for those 
affected. Without such governance reforms, 
REDD+ will, at best, not change much in the 
landscape and, most likely, given the flows of 
significant capital and the emergence of new actors 
and interests associated with REDD+, exacerbate 
institutional complexity and ambiguities, 
socioeconomic inequalities, and marginalization of 
forest-dependent populations.
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3.3. Decentralization and benefit 
sharing
3.3.1. Decentralization in forestry and land-
use planning
The issue of decentralization is controversial 
not only in the forestry sector but also in the 
REDD+ arena. On the one hand, decentralization 
is critical for building ownership among local 
stakeholders because local governments are 
important for forest management and because 
these actors and local communities participate in 
forest management and protection even without 
decentralization of authority over forests. On 
the other hand, experiences to date suggest that 
decentralization does not always lead to improved 
forest management. We therefore analyze 
decentralization in Laos and consider the pros and 
cons of its application for REDD+.
Laos has undergone several administrative reforms 
during recent decades. Following the shift from 
a command to a market economy in 1986, 
provinces were defined as strategic units for the 
elaboration of socioeconomic development plans 
and districts became responsible for refining and 
budgeting provincial plans. Villages were given 
responsibility for implementing plans devised 
by local authorities. This process gave provincial 
and district governments significant control over 
budgets and development planning, and they were 
authorized to grant land concessions to the private 
sector. However, with a lack of capacity and 
resources at the subnational level, deterioration of 
state services and mismanagement, recentralization 
began in the early 1990s (Stuart-Fox 2005). As 
a result, the role of the central government in 
planning development for subnational levels was 
reinforced, along with a short-term return to 
central budgets, which reduced the autonomy of 
provinces and districts.
A decade later, decentralization re-emerged. The 
2004 Law on Local Administration re-established 
the administrative roles and hierarchy defined in 
the late 1980s and provided for the emergence of 
consultative bodies at the village and district levels 
(GPAR 2004). More recently, Prime Ministerial 
Instruction No. 9 (2007) prompted the creation of 
“village development clusters” (kum ban pattana) 
as new subdistrict administrative units aimed at 
strengthening party leadership and facilitating 
local delivery of state services, such as technical 
and information service centers. In an effort to 
support bottom-up initiatives and decentralized 
planning, village cluster committees also were 
established and made responsible for compiling 
and submitting local socioeconomic development 
plans to the district administration. Although 
village development clusters are still in the process 
of being established countrywide, reports are 
already revealing major shortcomings linked to 
their inadequate resources and human capacity, 
unclear mandates, minimal political representation 
and the persistence of a top-down political culture 
(e.g., Foppes 2008).
While the creation of “village development 
clusters” reflects an important move toward 
decentralized decision making in socioeconomic 
planning, in the forestry sector, an opposite trend 
has ensued. The revised Forestry Law (2007) has 
effectively deprived districts of their authority to 
allocate land concessions on forest land. Since 
2007, the Provincial Land Management Authority 
has been the primary body for granting leases to 
nonprotected forest land of up to 150 ha. The 
National Land Management Authority has the 
power to allocate up to 15,000 ha of land, whereas 
larger concessions require the approval of the 
National Assembly. According to formal laws, 
then, district and village authorities are virtually 
devoid of power to make decisions about land 
concessions, even though they are the main bodies 
responsible for implementing plans devised at 
the provincial and central levels (Article 79 of the 
revised Forestry Law).
Village-level land-use planning has long been the 
cornerstone of the country’s land management 
system and, in principle, a key step toward the 
recognition of customary rights to use land and 
natural resources (Vandergeest 2003; Fujita and 
Phanvilay 2008). Village land-use planning is 
carried out by the District Agriculture and Forestry 
Office, other district financial and planning 
offices, and a village land management committee 
formed for the occasion; the process involves the 
negotiation of an agreement on village boundaries, 
forest and agricultural land demarcation, and 
land-use regulation. The village administration is 
responsible for monitoring forest and agricultural 
land uses, enforcing land regulation, allocating 
land to individual households and resolving land 
conflicts (MAF and NLMA 2009).
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Historically however, the authority of the local 
administration has long been subordinate to 
the national objectives of eradicating shifting 
cultivation and preserving forest resources. 
Thus, district planners have tended to discount 
local claims, instead designing plans that favor 
forest conservation over agriculture (Evrard 
2004; Ducourtieux et al. 2005; Lestrelin 2010). 
Important land issues have also reportedly arisen 
from uncoordinated planning interventions, 
such as land-use planning by District Agriculture 
and Forestry Offices and resettlement plans by 
District Governor’s Offices (Romagny and Daviau 
2003; Evrard and Goudineau 2004; Lestrelin 
and Giordano 2007). Recurrent concerns about 
minimal local participation and coordination 
between agencies eventually led to the introduction 
of PLUP at the village and village cluster levels. 
PLUP involves a wide range of district agencies 
and follows guidelines to ensure that local rights 
and interests are acknowledged (MAF and 
NLMA 2009).
From a legal and procedural perspective, therefore, 
the history of land-use planning in Laos has been 
marked by efforts to achieve decentralization and 
greater public participation (Lestrelin et al. 2011). 
As indicated in the previous section, however, 
in a context of weak governance and limited 
capacity for monitoring, law enforcement and 
extension, land-use decision making has long been 
decentralized in practice.
Only a few legal provisions cover the sharing 
of benefits from land-use revenues, all of which 
were established in relation to the management of 
national PFAs. Since the mid-1990s, the World 
Bank and the government of Finland have been 
supporting efforts by MAF to demarcate 106 PFAs 
covering about 3.2 million ha. To date, only half 
of these areas have been selected for community 
forestry and timber certification projects (GoL 
2005a) with 1.2 million ha subject (already or in 
the near future) to benefit-sharing arrangements 
under the SUFORD project (Puustjaervi 2011). 
Prime Ministerial Decree No. 59 on Sustainable 
Management of Production Forests in 2002 was 
the first legal instrument to set standard modalities 
for sharing the benefits of timber extraction in 
PFAs. However, only a very small share of the 
revenues (2%–4% of the total) actually went to 
local communities (FoF 2008; Puustjaervi 2011). 
To increase the benefits received by villagers, a 
new mechanism for benefit sharing was designed 
in 2011 and established through Presidential 
Decree No. 001/PR. This decree states that 70% 
of the total revenue from timber sales have to be 
paid to the National Treasury (with harvesting 
costs paid from this amount), with the remaining 
30% divided as follows: 20% to a national forest 
development fund, 40% to cover operating costs 
incurred by provincial and district authorities, 
and the remaining 40% transferred to village 
development funds.
Furthermore, the 2010 Prime Ministerial Decree 
No. 333 on Protection Forest requires hydropower 
and ecotourism projects to allocate 1% of their 
annual revenues to forest management and 
protection. Although this rule differs from other 
benefit-sharing schemes based on sustainable 
forest management, its application can generate 
benefits for communities. However, there are no 
clear guidelines on fund allocation and operators. 
Likely recipients of the new sources of revenue are 
the National Poverty Reduction, Environmental 
Protection and Forest Development Funds, 
which can distribute any monetary benefits 
accruing from resource development in the 
form of environmental payments and/or 
community development (Muziol et al. 2011; 
Puustjaervi 2011).
3.3.2. Implications for REDD+
According to Laos’ R-PP, the future institutional 
setup for REDD+ will be largely structured 
along the current forestry administration system. 
This means that it will likely be centered on the 
National Environment Committee (chaired by 
the Deputy Prime Minister) as the main body 
responsible for the design and validation of 
REDD+-related policy. The National REDD+ 
Taskforce, which was established in 2008, will 
perform a coordinating function across ministries, 
and the National REDD+ Office (within 
the Department of Forestry in MAF and the 
Department of Forest Resources Management 
in the Ministry of Natural Resources and 
Environment (MoNRE)) will oversee seven 
technical working groups on: the REDD+ 
legal framework; RELs; participation of ethnic 
groups and local communities; implementation 
and enforcement of mitigation measures; land 
use; MRV; and benefit sharing. Plans devised 
by stakeholders at the central level are then 
to be implemented by Provincial Agriculture 
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and Forestry Offices. Although this centralized 
model will allow for national, subnational (e.g., 
regulation and law enforcement) and project-based 
activities, the current context of limited political 
devolution and inadequate allocation of state 
resources for forest monitoring and management 
raises questions about how REDD+ schemes 
will incorporate local communities’ interests and 
responsibilities. If major efforts are not made to 
improve local participation and institute clear 
social and governance safeguards, the role of 
local communities may indeed be restricted to 
forest patrolling and inventory and restoration 
activities, with them deriving few or no benefits 
from REDD+ (Chokkalingam 2010). Finally, 
significant investments will also be needed to 
design transparent, efficient and equitable benefit-
sharing arrangements, which are important not 
only for communities but also for other potential 
REDD+ participants such as the private sector 
and NGOs. Experiences with community forestry 
in PFAs and the shortcomings of current benefit-
sharing regulations may offer useful lessons for 
future benefit sharing.
3.4. Indigenous rights and rights to 
carbon, land and trees
3.4.1. Indigenous rights in international and 
national contexts
Laos has not ratified the International Labour 
Organization’s Indigenous and Tribal Peoples 
Convention but it did vote in favor of the UN 
Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples 
in 2007. The country also celebrated International 
Day of the World’s Indigenous Peoples for the 
first time in 2009. Nevertheless, it has no specific 
legal provisions on indigenous rights and, more 
generally, no references to indigenous people in 
the law. Instead, the Constitution (amended in 
2003) recognizes the existence of diverse ethnic 
groups and their right to preserve their customs 
and traditions.
Although the Forestry Law recognizes the 
customary use of resources, all land and forests 
are legally defined as the property of the national 
community placed under the supervision and 
management of the state (Sipaseuth and Hunt 
2009). For example, MAF Instruction No. 54 
(1996) on customary rights and the use of forest 
resources indicates that all customary land uses are 
subordinated to the broader regulatory framework 
established at the central level. Article 42 of the 
2007 Forestry Law further establishes that:
Customary utilization of forests is the use 
of forest and forest products that has been 
practiced for a long time in accordance with 
laws and regulations. The State allows the use 
of timber and harvest of forest products in 
non-prohibited forests for household utilization 
without adverse impact on forest resources, 
and the environment as well as reflecting 
the rights and interest of individuals or 
organizations [authors’ emphasis].
As this shows, shifting cultivation is not considered 
a customary right of ethnic minorities. 
In addition, despite the Constitution’s claim 
that all ethnic groups in Laos are equal, 
ethnic minorities, especially those residing 
in mountainous rural areas of Laos, are often 
economically and socially marginalized (McAllister 
2012). Furthermore, as described in Section 
3.1.2, civil society remains fairly underdeveloped 
in the country. There is no active indigenous 
movement and no grassroots mobilization of 
indigenous peoples and their rights. Although 
some of the 50 local NGOs officially registered 
include members of ethnic minority groups, none 
of these organizations is devoted specifically to 
indigenous rights and self-governance. In fact, the 
public debate over indigenous issues appears to be 
nonexistent outside of the government framework 
(IWGIA 2010).
3.4.2. Tenure
National discussions about carbon tenure in Laos 
began with the preparation of the country’s R-PP. 
Four potential recipients of carbon rights and 
REDD+ payments were identified: government 
agencies at central and subnational levels, NGOs, 
private enterprises and local communities. 
However, a distinction is made between carbon 
rights holders and possible beneficiaries of carbon 
sales. The main stakeholders mentioned as 
recipients of direct carbon rights are governments 
and local communities. A concession agreement 
(or similar contract) could also make it possible for 
a private sector entity to acquire rights. In contrast, 
although some NGOs may seek compensation for 
costs incurred during project development, they 
are not pursuing carbon rights themselves; rather, 
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NGO involvement to date has been primarily 
focused on promoting the rights and benefits of 
those they seek to represent. 
As discussed above, the 2007 Forestry Law 
establishes that all land classified as forest 
is owned by the national community and 
managed by the state. However, individuals and 
organizations have full ownership of any trees 
that they have planted (Article 4). In principle, 
this provision constitutes a relatively good basis 
for local communities and other nongovernment 
actors to participate in the carbon stock 
enhancement component of REDD+. The 
question of carbon tenure becomes more complex 
with regard to avoided deforestation and forest 
degradation on existing forest land. In the 
following, we analyze the tenure issues for each 
category of land.
3.4.2.1. State forestland
About 12.5 million ha of state production, 
conservation and protection forests were 
delineated in 2011 (see Section 1), which is 
more than half of the country’s total surface area 
(23,860,000 ha). The government seeks to expand 
the area of protection forests from 6 million ha 
to 8.2 million ha by 2015 (Ounekham 2011). All 
these areas are under the authority of the forestry 
administration and conversion from conservation 
or protection forest to production forest or any 
other land use must be approved by the National 
Assembly. However, although commercial 
logging concessions may only be granted in 
production forests (by Provincial Agriculture and 
Forestry Offices, following quotas allocated by 
MAF), in recent years a substantial amount of 
logging has been approved in the catchment areas 
of proposed hydroelectric dams (Baird 2010b). 
More generally, in areas that do not receive 
financial and technical support from international 
organizations, state conservation, production and 
protection forests are often marked on paper only 
(GoL 2005a).
3.4.2.2. Village agricultural and forest land
In controlled-use zones in state protection, 
conservation and production forests (see Section 
2.1.) and, more generally, outside state forestland, 
a village land-use planning and land allocation 
system is in place that differentiates between 
residential land, agricultural land (current and 
reserve) and three categories of forests: protection 
and conservation forests, in which all land uses are 
prohibited; and village-use forests, in which limited 
logging and collection of forest products are 
permitted. The village land-use plan is negotiated 
between district and village administrations and 
agricultural land is allocated to individuals and 
households by the village authorities (MAF and 
NLMA 2009). The 2003 Land Law allows the 
following areas to be allocated:
•	 paddy land: up to 1 ha per labor unit per 
household
•	 commercial annual and perennial crops: up to 
3 ha per labor unit per household
•	 tree plantations: up to 3 ha per labor unit per 
household
•	 natural or improved pastures: up to 15 ha per 
labor unit per household
•	 degraded forestland for agricultural production: 
up to 3 ha per labor unit per household.
Land-use titles can be issued by the District Land 
Management Authority (renamed the Department 
of Natural Resources and Environment at the 
time MoNRE was created in 2011) for land 
under permanent agriculture, such as paddy 
fields, tree plantations and annual crops, but 
excluding shifting cultivation. A temporary land-
use certificate is issued, which can be upgraded to 
a permanent title after 3 years. Once a permanent 
title has been allocated to an individual, the land 
can be sold, exchanged, leased or transferred 
as inheritance. Upgrading is conditional upon 
compliance with the village land-use plan. Prime 
Ministerial Decree No. 88 on the Implementation 
of the Land Law (2007) also allows for collective 
titles to be issued for village-use forests, pastures 
and rotational agricultural land; this collective land 
cannot be sold or transferred. Village protection 
and conservation forests remain the full property 
of the state; no individual or collective titling of 
these is possible but the village administration is 
responsible for enforcing state regulations in these 
areas (Liu and Sigaty 2009).
There is a critical dearth of recent and consistent 
data on the outcomes of village land-use planning 
for land zoning and allocation nationwide. 
According to MAF, the scheme has been 
implemented in 7130 villages (out of some 10,500 
villages), covering about 9 million ha of land in 
2005 (Figure 3).
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However, village land-use planning has been 
widely criticized over the past two decades for 
its approach to land tenure and tenure rights. 
Numerous reports have highlighted a strong 
tendency among planners to favor forest land over 
agricultural land during zoning activities (e.g., 
Aubertin 2003; Evrard 2004; Ducourtieux et al. 
2005; Lestrelin 2010); see also Figure 3. Equally 
important are reports of poor and uneven efforts to 
renew and upgrade temporary land-use certificates 
(to permanent land titles over lowland peri-urban 
areas and perennial land uses), the very slow 
development of collective land titling and, more 
generally, the limited binding and securing value 
of tenure arrangements (e.g., Evrard 2004; Barney 
2007; Fujita and Phanvilay 2008).
3.4.2.3. Land concessions
Land concessions for mining, hydropower, 
agribusiness and plantation development have been 
booming in Laos in recent years (Dwyer 2007). 
Prime Ministerial Decree No. 135 (2009) allows 
agribusiness and plantation concession contracts on 
degraded forest land to run for 30–40 years, with 
the possibility to extend “on a case-by-case basis” 
(Article 28). The Provincial Land Management 
Authority (now moved to the Provincial Offices 
of Natural Resources and the Environment) 
was given the authority to grant concessions up 
to 150 ha and the National Land Management 
Authority (now within MoNRE) is responsible 
for granting land concessions up to 15,000 ha. 
Larger concession grants must be approved by the 
National Assembly.
Although the exact extent of land concessions 
granted at the national level is unknown, MAF 
estimated that 1.5 million ha was conceded 
to agribusiness and plantation companies in 
2010 (GoL 2010a). Arguing that China alone 
is demanding 1 million ha for food production, 
Schoenweger and Üllenberg (2009) estimate that 
the reality is probably closer to 2–3 million ha, 
or 10%–15% of the national territory. In any 
case, only 500,000 ha of these concessions would 
already have been planted and much less would be 
at the production stage. As Barney (2010) reports, 
the key companies active in the plantation sector 
are primarily foreign corporations, including Oji 
Lao Plantation Forest (Japan): 50,000 ha; Birla Lao 
Pulp & Plantations (India): 50,000 ha; Paksong 
Highland (Thailand): 26,000 ha; Daklak Rubber 
(Vietnam): 10,000 ha; Viet‐Lao Joint Stock 
Rubber (Vietnam): 10,000 ha; Cityland Resources 
(Malaysia): 3500 ha.
Also lacking are accurate data on the current 
extent, location and status of land concessions 
granted (Dwyer 2007; Hanssen 2007). For 
instance, an inventory by the National Land 
3.6%
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Protection and conservation forests
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Fruit and industrial tree plantations
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Figure 3. Land zoned and allocated at the village level, 1995–2005.
Note: The relative distribution of each category of forest land is estimated based on the 2001 figures. Source: GoL (2005a)
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Management Authority (NLMA) and the German 
Agency for Technical Cooperation (GTZ) (NLMA 
2009) found that, out of 237 land concession 
projects active in Vientiane Province, 40% were 
not documented at all in the relevant agencies at 
provincial and district levels; that is, concession 
agreements and land-use plans were missing. 
Furthermore, only 5% of the documented projects 
had detailed and accurate concession maps. One 
reason for this lack is companies’ need to search 
for suitable land and reach local agreements once 
the concession has been granted at the national 
level. In this context, overlaps between approved 
land concession areas and between private 
concessions and other local land uses are frequent, 
leading to serious land conflicts (Schoenweger and 
Üllenberg 2009; Kenney-Lazar 2010). In response, 
MoNRE is making concerted efforts to clarify and 
harmonize land-use planning and allocation across 
the country. The ministry submitted national and 
provincial land-use master plans to the National 
Assembly in 2010 and it is now finalizing a 
national inventory of land concessions. In addition 
to this very ambitious objective, MoNRE also has a 
target of completing or updating village boundary 
delineation, land-use zoning and land titling for 
the whole country by 2015.
3.4.3. Implications for REDD+
As seen above, government agencies are the main 
holders of forest carbon rights, and so can be 
expected to be the key beneficiaries from REDD+ 
schemes. Although this remains to be established 
in law, private enterprises may in theory acquire 
carbon rights through a concession agreement 
(or similar contract) and thus also receive 
REDD+ payments for efforts in promoting 
sustainable forestry and plantations. Less clear 
is the extent to which local communities would 
benefit from REDD+. Under the current legal 
framework, local communities may be able to 
claim carbon rights to planted trees and possibly 
collective rights to use village production forests. 
However, they are unlikely to be eligible to claim 
rights to the carbon-rich areas that will generate 
the greatest benefits from REDD+, such as 
protection and conservation forests. 
To benefit local communities, REDD+ would 
have to require the allocation of titles on all 
types of village forest land, including protection 
and conservation forests, or the establishment 
of forest management contracts that include 
protection and conservation forests. Village 
Land and Forest Management Agreements 
established during PLUP and certified by district 
administrations could serve as binding contracts. 
However, such agreements are limited in terms of 
tenure security in areas with land concessions and 
state development projects. Ultimately, if local 
communities are not granted strong forest tenure 
and carbon rights, REDD+ could contribute to 
further marginalizing forest-dwelling populations 
already largely excluded from the management 
of carbon-rich areas by resettlement and village 
land-use planning schemes.
The political economy of 
deforestation and forest 
degradation
resettlements. However, historical studies of 
population displacements between 1975 and 1990 
show that, in some provinces in northern Laos, 
more than half of the population may have been 
moved from the uplands to valley regions (Evrard 
and Goudineau 2004).
The late 1980s saw dramatic changes in Laos’ 
political economy. As the aid supplied by the 
Soviet Union since the 1970s dried up, the 
government of Laos had to find alternative sources 
of support. Following a decade of relative isolation, 
Laos engaged in wide-ranging reforms oriented 
toward liberalization of the domestic economy. The 
so-called “New Economic Mechanism” of 1986 
paved the way for major regulatory reforms, such 
as restructuring of the tax system, encouragement 
of foreign investment, privatization, creation of 
tenure rights and private sector development. At 
the same time, multilateral and regional banks 
(e.g., World Bank, ADB) and international 
development agencies (e.g., United Nations 
agencies, Swedish International Development 
Cooperation Agency) offered Laos new sources of 
financial and technical support. 
During this transition, development agencies and 
the government alike used scientific findings to 
rationalize land uses and national development 
(Lestrelin et al. 2012). For example, to achieve 
sustainable rural development, a series of “eco-
zones” were demarcated, and scientific assessments 
of the risks of ecological degradation and recovery 
rates were called on to balance the goals of 
development and conservation (Goldman 2001). 
Also during the 1990s, a policy known as Land-
Use Planning and Land Allocation (LUPLA) 
emerged as a major instrument for regulating 
access to land and forest through demarcation of 
village boundaries and forest and agricultural land 
zoning. Furthermore, LUPLA led to the “three 
plots per household” regulation aimed at curbing 
4
In this section, we investigate the political-
economic factors underlying the drivers of 
deforestation and forest degradation to identify 
enabling factors and obstacles for REDD+ policies. 
Land and forest policy and governance in Laos 
have undergone major transformations during the 
past three decades, fueled by successive changes in 
the government’s political-economic strategies for 
state building and socioeconomic development. 
As discussed by Lestrelin et al. (2012), three 
political-economic projects in particular, which 
started at different times but which all continue 
to the present, have influenced the dynamics 
of deforestation and forest degradation in the 
country: Moving People from the Hills (launched 
1975), Rationalizing Land Use (1990) and 
Turning Land into Capital (1997). The first two 
projects are discussed in Section 4.1 and Turning 
Land into Capital is discussed in Section 4.2.
4.1. Recent history of land and forest 
governance in Laos
During the late 1970s, Laos’ newly independent 
Communist leadership made significant efforts to 
build state legitimacy and reinforce state control 
over national territory and resources. After years 
of armed conflict (1959–1975) and with little in 
the way of financial resources or human capacity, 
these efforts involved the resettlement of remote 
populations to more accessible areas, mainly along 
roads and rivers. Although the original aim of 
resettlement programs was to secure the national 
territory and increase state control over remote 
(potentially subversive) populations, the strategy 
was continued as a means of facilitating the 
delivery of state services and eradicating subsistence 
shifting cultivation, which the central government 
deemed unproductive and environmentally 
destructive (Baird and Shoemaker 2007). There 
are no official figures on the exact extent of 
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the expansion of shifting cultivation — identified 
as a cause of deforestation — and encouraging 
farmers to intensify their upland cropping 
systems. By restricting village and individual land 
access, LUPLA encouraged sedentarization and 
the establishment of permanent fields, especially 
among populations living in mountainous 
areas. Finally, at the same time that LUPLA was 
implemented, the government started to demarcate 
large areas of state conservation, production and 
protection forests.
Resettlement programs, village-level land reforms, 
LUPLA and the demarcation of state forests 
all gradually led to the disconnection of rural 
livelihoods from forest resources (Castella et al. 
2012). Throughout the country, rural communities 
were moved away from dense forests (subsequently 
classified as state forests) and gathered in locations 
with high population density where existing 
forest resources have since been rapidly degraded. 
Until the mid-1990s, this segregation between 
community-managed agricultural lands and state-
managed forest lands gave the three military-run 
SOEs ample scope to exploit timber resources and 
develop relatively straightforward trade agreements 
with buyers from countries such as Vietnam, 
Thailand, Taiwan and Malaysia (Lang 2001).
Another important shift in land and forest 
governance occurred in the late 1990s: in line 
with the “green neo-liberal” models advocated by 
donors such as the World Bank and the ADB, 
“turning land into capital” became the key strategy 
for achieving national development goals (Lestrelin 
et al. 2012).
4.2. Turning land into capital
As Goldman (2001) explains, international 
financial institutions tend to support large 
capital projects such as hydroelectric dams, 
large-scale mining operations and plantations, 
viewing them as valuable not only for increasing 
government revenues and developing marginal 
regions but also for providing poor populations 
with alternative livelihoods and, hence, diverting 
them from imposing excessive pressure on the 
environment. In line with this perspective and 
with support from the World Bank, ADB and 
several foreign state-owned enterprises and private 
companies, the government of Laos developed 
a strategy of transforming the country into the 
“battery of Southeast Asia”. In addition to the 
10 hydroelectric dams already in operation, 60 new 
dams are planned or under construction, with 
95% of the electricity produced from these dams 
meant for export to Thailand, Vietnam and China 
(Matthews 2012). Mining also is a key strategic 
sector for “turning land into capital” and the 
government of Laos expects a major increase in 
mining activities in the coming years (GoL 2010b). 
More than 4 million ha of land is being prospected 
or explored by foreign companies, mainly Chinese 
and Vietnamese (Wellmann 2012). However, 
as discussed above, hydropower and mining 
are primary drivers of deforestation and forest 
degradation in Laos, and conversion of forest to 
hydropower and mining concessions has been a 
primary source of timber exports during the past 
10 years (Barney and Canby 2011).
Another government strategy is to facilitate 
private investment in agriculture and forestry as 
a means of ending the persistent lack of financial, 
technical and human resources needed for rural 
development. Through agribusiness, industrial 
concessions and contract farming arrangements, it 
is expected that private sector investment will both 
increase national revenue through fees and taxes on 
concessions and industrial production and provide 
the capital and technology needed to support the 
modernization and intensification of rural land 
uses. Yet although this policy shift has proven 
efficient for attracting private (mostly foreign) 
capital, its impacts on land and forest governance 
are more ambivalent. Over the past decade, Laos 
has become an important “resource frontier” for 
transnational capital flows and investment (Barney 
2009). Supported by land investment policies (e.g., 
Presidential Decree No. 02/2009 establishes land 
leasing fees of USD 5–50 per ha for agricultural 
production and tree plantations), the agribusiness, 
forestry and wood-processing sectors of countries 
such as Vietnam, China and Thailand have 
invested significant financial resources in Laos and 
propelled massive and largely uncontrolled land 
deals, forest conversion and timber extraction. 
Land deals, deforestation and forest degradation 
are strongly correlated in Laos (Barney and Canby 
2011), with many concessionaires harvesting 
the timber from the land they were allocated for 
development before selling the lease rights to a 
third party. A look at the demand side uncovers 
the driving forces behind this process.
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Government reforms in Laos in the late 1990s 
aimed at easing private land investment coincided 
with a boom in demand in neighboring countries 
for timber and land for commercial plantations. 
For instance, the forestry sector in China, which 
began economic reforms in 1978, underwent a 
transformation (Wang et al. 2004): forest tenure 
was devolved to smallholders, forestry SOEs 
were reformed, stumpage fees were introduced 
and prices for forest products were liberalized. 
During the late 1990s, the government shifted 
its strategic focus from timber production 
to environmental protection. Forestry policy 
was redirected toward the afforestation and 
regeneration of degraded forest lands and a 
logging ban was established in natural forests. 
At the same time, to reduce pressure and avoid 
potential conflicts over access to domestic land 
and forest resources, China’s central government 
adopted its “Go Out” (zou chu qu) strategy, 
which offered Chinese companies incentives to 
invest abroad, such as subsidies for relocation and 
tax exemption on imports (Mann 2009).
Dramatic changes have also occurred in the 
Vietnamese forestry and wood-processing 
sectors over the past 20 years (Meyfroidt et al. 
2010). Throughout the 1990s, the government 
of Vietnam shifted away from sourcing timber 
from natural forests in favor of plantations and 
imports. At the same time, it began exporting 
less raw timber and more value-added processed 
timber products. Legal reforms enacted in 
1993 led to the progressive devolution of forest 
tenure in rural areas. The same year, a logging 
ban was implemented in Vietnam, which was 
later expanded to cover more than half of the 
country’s natural forests in 1998. Despite illegal 
logging and the emergence of a smallholder tree 
plantation sector, the domestic timber supply 
remained insufficient to meet the growing 
needs of the wood-processing industry. As a 
result, Vietnam increasingly sources its timber 
through imports, both legal and illegal, from 
Laos and Cambodia (EIA 2011, 2012). Thailand 
underwent similar changes, driven by a national 
logging ban imposed in 1989, the subsequent 
transnationalization of several large agribusiness 
and forestry companies, and the domestic wood-
processing industry’s heavy reliance on imports 
from neighboring countries (Woods et al. 2011).
This combination of centralized forest governance, 
high demand in Vietnam, Thailand and China 
for land and forest resources, the government of 
Laos’s pressing need for money, and associated 
reforms for easing land investment led to the 
emergence of powerful transnational networks 
connecting private and public buyers and investors 
(and sometimes high-ranking officials from foreign 
countries) to Laos’ political and economic elites. 
By involving these elites in business arrangements 
and joint ventures, these networks gain access 
to higher levels of government and negotiate 
grants of large-scale land and forestry concessions, 
generally in exchange for financing development 
interventions (Dwyer 2011). As a result, as several 
researchers have noted, many large-scale land and 
forest resource deals concluded in Laos in the 
past decade have involved the outsourcing and/
or partial privatization of rural and infrastructure 
development. Shi (2008) and Tan (2012), for 
instance, observe that large-scale land leases and 
contract farming arrangements with Chinese 
rubber enterprises were signed alongside China–
Laos bilateral cooperation agreements. Kenney-
Lazar (2012) reports that a private Vietnamese 
corporation managed to obtain a 10,000-ha 
concession for timber extraction and rubber 
plantation in exchange for financing infrastructure 
development in Vientiane.
Over the past decade, transnational land 
investment and timber trade networks have thus 
functioned as key drivers of forest conversion 
and degradation in Laos, along with large capital 
hydropower and mining projects. Patron–client 
relations, collusion and corruption certainly 
play major roles in the establishment and 
functioning of these networks (Baird 2011). The 
government’s weak capacity for monitoring and 
law enforcement also makes closing land and 
forest resource deals easier (Barney and Canby 
2011). Somewhat paradoxically, however, such 
transnational networks — connecting Lao and 
foreign government officials, public and private 
enterprises, local communities, and foreign 
workers, among others — might derive their 
power primarily from their role as a key source of 
funding for rural and infrastructure development 
in a country marked by a persistent shortage of 
financial capital (Dwyer 2011). Through these 
networks, foreign governments find opportunities 
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to reduce pressure on domestic resources (e.g., 
the Chinese “Go Out” strategy), investors and 
buyers can secure profitable deals on land and 
forest resources, and the government of Laos 
gains access to funding for rural and infrastructure 
development, which in turn reinforces the 
legitimacy of the state. In the absence of domestic 
counter-powers such as indigenous movements or 
a strong and independent civil society, this bundle 
of converging interests between powerful political 
and economic elites drives the current trend of 
land and natural resource acquisition, deforestation 
and forest degradation. Furthermore, projections 
on the growth of the Lao economy (World Bank 
2011b) indicate that hydropower, mining and 
industrial tree plantations will continue to make 
important contributions at least for several years, at 
the expense of natural resources, and with further 
deforestation and degradation of forests.
REDD+ policy environment: Actors, 
policy events and processes
In response to the Kyoto Protocol and Nationally 
Appropriate Mitigation Actions (NAMA) 
introduced in the Bali Action Plan in 2007, the 
government of Laos began closely managing its 
environment and natural resources alongside 
efforts to achieve sustainable socioeconomic 
development and poverty reduction. The 
government developed policies and resolutions and 
issued national strategies in a number of sectors 
(GoL 2009), including: the Forestry Strategy 2020 
(2005), the National Strategy on Climate Change 
(2010), Agricultural Development Strategy 2020 
(2010) and the Seventh National Socioeconomic 
Development Plan (2011–2015) of 2010. The 
government also underwent an institutional 
restructure. In particular, a new ministry (MoNRE) 
was established; also the National REDD+ Office 
was established at the Department of Forestry and 
subnational REDD+ Offices will be established at 
the province level (see Section 5.4).
Despite these relatively rapid and wide-ranging 
institutional developments, policy and project 
implementation appear to be proceeding much 
more slowly. Two CDM projects have been 
registered by the Board of Designated National 
Authorities: an energy efficiency project in a 
brewery (Proact International Incorporation, begun 
in 2007) and a hydropower project (Xekhaman 3 
Power Company, begun in 2011). Eight additional 
projects in the hydropower (five), biogas (one), 
cement (one) and afforestation (one) sectors were 
approved by the board in 2012 and are currently 
undergoing validation (IGES and MoNRE 
2011). According to Hanh et al. (2006), however, 
Laos is not highly attractive for CDM project 
investors because it has relatively little potential for 
greenhouse gas emission removals and its CDM and 
market institutions are weak. 
5
5.1. Broader climate change policy 
context
The government of Laos ratified the UNFCCC in 
1995 and the Kyoto Protocol in February 2003 
(GoL 2010). In 2007, a Prime Ministerial Decree 
was issued pertaining to the regulation of Clean 
Development Mechanism (CDM) activities in 
Laos. The decree defined the Water Resources and 
Environmental Agency (WREA) as the designated 
national authority responsible for approval of 
CDM projects. With the creation of MoNRE in 
June 2011 and the merging of WREA into the new 
ministry, the CDM Executive Board was moved 
into MoNRE.
A National Environmental Council was established 
in October 2008, chaired by the Deputy Prime 
Minister and the Ministers of MAF, MoNRE, 
and the Ministry of Planning and Investment. 
The committee oversees seven working groups on 
agriculture and food security; forestry and land-use 
change; water resources; energy and transportation; 
industry; urban development; and public health 
(GoL 2010). Building on these working groups 
and with support from the UN Development 
Programme and Global Environment Facility, 
the government of Laos developed a National 
Adaptation Programme of Action (NAPA) for 
climate change in 2009 and adopted a National 
Strategy on Climate Change in March 2010. In 
line with these developments, climate change was 
included in the Seventh National Socioeconomic 
Development Plan (2011–2015) as a key challenge 
to be addressed through mitigation measures in 
the environment sector. The plan estimates that 
climate change effects reduce GDP by about 1.1% 
each year. Laos is also part of the Mekong River 
Commission’s “Climate Change and Adaption 
Initiative” started in 2011.
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The NAMA, which is undergoing a feasibility 
study, focuses on the development of an urban 
transportation master plan for Vientiane, funded 
by the Japanese Ministry of the Environment. 
However, with lack of clarity over coordination 
and difficulties in disbursing funding, activities 
related to the NAMA have mainly consisted of 
awareness-raising meetings, capacity building and 
training in assessment of greenhouse gas emissions. 
Representatives of the government of Laos stated 
during COP 15 in Copenhagen (December 2009) 
that REDD+ is not suitable for inclusion in its 
NAMA:
Laos does not support REDD+ being 
administered under the Nationally Appropriate 
Mitigation Actions (NAMAs) framework, 
because policies and measures, as well as 
action plans and strategies, are very difficult 
to quantify in terms of impact on emissions 
within the Land Use and Forestry sector. 
(GoL 2011a, 45)
Overall, although afforestation and reforestation 
objectives have long been core elements of 
successive national development strategies 
(see Section 3), the government of Laos has 
only very recently started to make explicit the 
linkages between these objectives and climate 
change adaptation and mitigation. Afforestation 
and reforestation policies and large-scale forest 
management projects (e.g., SUFORD) made 
no reference to climate change at the time they 
were conceived, but with the opportunities for 
international support and funding that have arisen 
since then, most are being redefined to link back 
to mitigation and adaptation. The government of 
Laos has come to view REDD+ as a potentially 
important source of technical and financial support 
for achieving its longstanding afforestation and 
reforestation objectives. As the Lao delegation at 
COP 15 in December 2009 presented:
Laos desires a flexible stand-alone 
internationally binding agreement for 
reducing emissions from deforestation and 
forest degradation; with enhancement of 
carbon stocks, conservation and sustainable 
management of forests. Such a scope supports 
the Forest Strategy 2020 and the 5-year plan 
of the Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry. It 
also supports the ambitious target of achieving 
70% forest coverage of land area in Laos 
by 2020. [... REDD+] activities should be 
country driven, voluntary, take into account 
national circumstances and capacities, respect 
country sovereignty, facilitate sustainable 
development, reduce poverty, promote 
broad country participation and be subject 
to equitable, adequate, predictable and 
sustainable financing, with financing included 
for technology support and capacity building. 
(GoL 2011a, 45)
Finally, the lack of a donor coordination 
committee fits with the government’s preference 
for a hybrid approach to REDD+ financing 
(see Section 5.4.2) and implementation, that 
is, integration of multiple sources of funding 
(bilateral, multilateral and market based) and 
nesting of national and project-based REDD+ 
initiatives. Under this approach, the Ministry of 
Planning and Investment will essentially remain 
responsible for coordinating national activities, as it 
is the key authority for engaging with international 
donors and the private sector and channeling 
technical and financial support to certain sectors 
and locations.
5.2. REDD+ policy actors, events and 
policy processes
According to the interviews with the key 
government institutions and NGOs at the 
national level, government decision makers are 
likely to have concerns about investing (scarce) 
resources in complex REDD+ activities, given the 
uncertainty surrounding global commitments on 
climate change.  Nevertheless, REDD+ came onto 
the national policy agenda as early as 2007. The 
government applied to participate in the Forest 
Carbon Partnership Facility (FCPF) in November 
2007 and officials from the WREA joined COP 13 
in Bali in December 2007 (in the absence of 
forestry specialists, however, the Lao delegation 
had said little in the discussions (Trockenbrodt 
2008)). In June 2008, the Department of 
Forestry under MAF, with inputs from experts 
from various organizations, including the World 
Bank, Japan International Cooperation Agency 
(JICA), Swedish International Development 
Coordination Agency (SIDA), GIZ, International 
Union for Conservation of Nature (IUCN) and 
WCS, submitted a Readiness Plan Idea Note 
(R-PIN) to the FCPF. In the same month, officials 
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from the Department of Forestry, the National 
Agriculture and Forestry Research Institute and 
the Faculty of Forestry of the National University 
of Laos participated in a UNFCCC methodology 
workshop in Japan, which led to the development 
of a concept note on “Establishing Forest Carbon 
Monitoring and Reference Scenarios in Laos”.
In November 2008, MAF established, via Decree 
No. 1313, the National REDD+ Taskforce, 
chaired by the Director General of the Department 
of Forestry. The taskforce has a legal mandate for 
(1) management of FCPF processes, (2) promotion 
and coordination of planning and implementation 
of REDD+ project and pilots, (3) participation 
in and observation of international climate 
change dialogues and REDD+ negotiations, and 
(4) capacity building through workshops and 
seminars. The taskforce’s 12 members come from:
•	 Departments of Forestry and Forest Inspection 
(MAF)
•	 National Agriculture and Forestry Research 
Institute (MAF)
•	 National Agriculture and Forestry Extension 
Services (MAF)
•	 Department of Land Use Planning and 
Development (NLMA at the Prime Minister’s 
Office)
•	 Department of Environment (WREA at the 
Prime Minister’s Office)
•	 Faculty of Forestry of the National University 
of Laos
•	 Mining and Electricity Departments (Ministry 
of Energy and Mines).
In October 2009, Laos obtained a REDD+ R-PP 
grant from the FCPF, and the REDD+ taskforce 
submitted the country’s R-PP to the FCPF 
in August 2010. The taskforce was expanded 
in January 2011 to encompass cross-sectoral 
organizations. The new structure was made official 
in July 2011 through MAF Decision No. 0006, 
which assigned leadership to the Director General 
of the Department of Forestry and listed 15 
additional members from the organizations listed 
above, as well as from:
•	 Department of Law (Ministry of Justice)
•	 Department of Planning (Ministry of Planning 
and Investment)
•	 Division of External Finance (Ministry of 
Finance)
•	 Three state unions: Lao Front for National 
Construction, Lao Women’s Union and Lao 
Chamber of Commerce.
However, as the new ministry (MoNRE) was 
established in June 2011, the membership of 
organizations in the REDD+ taskforce is being 
revised. Parts of the former Department of Land 
Use Planning & Development at NLMA and 
the Department of Environment in the WREA 
were moved from the Prime Minister’s Office to 
MoNRE. Furthermore, the creation of the new 
ministry affected MAF’s Department of Forestry, 
especially the Division of Forest Conservation and 
Division of Forest Protection and Restoration, 
which have been integrated into MoNRE as the 
Department of Forest Resource Management. 
This organizational restructuring of MoNRE and 
MAF means the responsibility for implementation 
of REDD+ is now divided between these two 
ministries. The terms of reference of the new 
department (Department of Forest Resource 
Management (in MoNRE)) cover REDD+ 
implementation in protection and conservation 
forests, whereas the Department of Forestry (MAF) 
remains responsible for REDD+ implementation 
in production forests and forest areas under village 
management (FCPF 2012). After the terms of 
reference for these two ministries were revised and 
resubmitted in February 2011, the FCPF finally 
approved the R-PP for Laos in October 2012. The 
new funding from FCPF for implementation of 
REDD+ in Laos is expected to be available by the 
third quarter of 2013.
In June 2010, while developing its R-PP, Laos 
was selected as a pilot country for the FIP. The 
FIP in Laos was developed to dovetail with 
the Forestry Strategy 2020 and to address the 
drivers of deforestation and forest degradation, 
as identified in Laos’ R-PP. The main objective 
is to support existing efforts to bring all forests 
and forest resources under participatory and 
sustainable protection, development and 
management. The FIP’s ambition is to remove 
any scope for the various drivers of deforestation 
and forest degradation to operate. In January 
2012, the government endorsed an investment 
plan, to be partly supported by a grant of USD 
30 million from the World Bank, the ADB and 
the International Finance Corporation. Support 
under the FIP will target primarily REDD+, 
with some attention to interventions to build 
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resilience to climate change. Essentially, the FIP 
is supporting existing activities, namely (1) the 
ADB-funded Biodiversity Conservation Corridor 
project, as well as similar projects by JICA, 
GIZ, WCS and WWF in and around national 
protection and conservation forests, (2) industrial 
tree plantation and contract farming initiatives 
operated by licensed private companies, and (3) 
the SUFORD Project (funded by the World Bank 
and the government of Finland), along with plans 
to expand SUFORD to cover the entire PFA. 
Although the approved project document lists 
eight target provinces (Luang Prabang, Bokeo, 
Xayaboury and Huaphanh Provinces in northern 
Laos; Bolikhamxay and Khammuane Provinces in 
central Laos; Attapeu and Saravane Provinces in 
the south), recent discussions at the central level 
suggest that FIP support could be limited to buffer 
zones around conservation areas.
REDD+ development in Laos is also being 
supported through bilateral and multilateral 
initiatives. Most recently, in November 2012, 
Laos was accepted as a partner country of the 
UN-REDD Programme, thus becoming eligible 
for targeted capacity building and financial 
support through UN agencies (UN-REDD 2012). 
Bilateral aid has made an important contribution 
to the development of REDD+ policy in Laos. 
The Climate Protection through Avoided 
Deforestation (CliPAD) program funded by the 
German Development Bank (KfW) has been 
particularly influential in facilitating the discussion 
and development of the national framework 
for REDD+ in Laos. This program, which was 
launched in January 2012, is operated through the 
Department of Forestry with technical support 
from GIZ and WCS. CliPAD has also engaged 
Lao academics from the Faculty of Forestry of the 
National University of Laos to review national 
legislation on forests, land tenure and land use. The 
aim of the review is to identify inconsistencies and 
gaps in the legal framework and provide specific 
recommendations for implementing REDD+ in 
Laos; the findings are expected to contribute also 
to the revision of the Forestry Law, which will be 
submitted to the National Assembly in 2013.
CliPAD supports not only national REDD+ 
policy development but also subnational activities 
in and around the two NPAs of Nam Phouy 
and Nam Et-Phou Loey. Pilot activities in 
Nam Phouy progressed quite rapidly, with, for 
example, the completion of a feasibility study 
following the Verified Carbon Standard (VCS) 
methodology VM0006 and engagement in free, 
prior and informed consent (FPIC) through the 
Lao Biodiversity Association; however, these have 
been postponed because of tensions with the Lao 
military authorities responsible for monitoring the 
NPA border area with Thailand (Article 16 of the 
2007 Forestry Law states that forest management 
plans shall follow the principles of socioeconomic 
development and national defense and security 
plans) (GoL 2007b). FPIC as implemented in 
Nam Phouy has been seen as a pioneering effort 
for Laos by formally ascertaining whether local 
communities consent to participate in development 
projects in their areas. In Nam Et-Phou Loey, 
a feasibility study found that a REDD+ project 
following VCS guidelines would not be financially 
sustainable because of low historical rates of 
deforestation. Low observed deforestation in the 
NPA is partly linked to limitations in interpreting 
satellite images and/or the historical management 
of forest in the NPA. Consequently, CliPAD 
has opted for an alternative, jurisdictional 
approach (VCS Jurisdictional and Nested 
REDD+) aimed at establishing RELs and 
designing REDD+ mechanisms in Huaphanh and 
Xayaboury Provinces. Currently, Huameuang 
District in Huaphanh Province is selected as the 
demonstration site of the project, whereas the 
project team (which included officials from the 
Department of Forestry and other concerned 
departments) is working with relevant authorities 
(from national to local) to select a district or 
districts as the demonstration site of the project in 
Xayaboury Province.
Other major projects that aim to assist REDD+ 
in Laos through institutional support, capacity 
building and/or pilot activities include the 
following:
•	 Grassroots Capacity Building for REDD+ in 
Asia Pacific: started in August 2009, funded 
by Norad, run by the Faculty of Forestry 
of the National University of Laos and the 
Department of Forestry in MAF with support 
from the Center for People and Forests 
(RECOFTC)
•	 Participatory Land and Forest Management 
Project for Reducing Deforestation (PAREDD): 
started in January 2010, funded by JICA, run 
by the Department of Forestry and the National 
Agriculture and Forestry Extension Service with 
technical support from JICA
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•	 Lowering Emissions in Asia’s Forests (LEAF): 
regional initiative started in February 2011, 
funded by USAID, run by SNV, Winrock, 
Climate Focus and the US Forest Service
•	 Carbon & Biodiversity (CarBi): started in 
January 2012 along the border of southern 
Laos and central Vietnam, funded by KfW, 
run by the Departments of Forestry and Forest 
Inspection (MAF) with technical support 
from WWF
•	 Sustainable Forest and Rural Development 
(SUFORD): 3-year project (2009–2012) 
with a REDD+ component, supported by the 
World Bank and the government of Finland, 
in central and southern provinces; project 
activities are run jointly by the Department of 
Forestry, National Agriculture and Forestry 
Research Institute, National Agriculture and 
Forestry Extension Services, provincial and 
district agriculture and forestry offices, and local 
communities (GoL 2011a)
•	 Improving Xe Pian NPA (now in its second 
phase): started in August 2011, supported by 
WWF-Germany through WWF-Laos office 
(2011–2013). The primary activities of the 
project are sustainable forest management, 
wildlife conservation, law enforcement 
and capacity building for subnational and 
local communities on sustainable resource 
management within the NPA. A secondary 
activity is a REDD+ feasibility study under the 
VCS. Activities are run by the Department of 
Natural Resources (MoNRE) with technical 
support from WWF-Laos and OeBF-Germany.
The private sector also has become involved in 
REDD+ in Laos. In early 2012, New Chip Xeng, 
a Thai shipping company in a joint venture 
with Honda in Laos, invested USD 3 million to 
conduct a VCS feasibility study, assisted by Laos’ 
Prime Consultancy Company. New Chip Xeng 
reportedly aims to develop a subnational REDD+ 
public–private partnership on 550,000 ha of NPA 
in four provinces (Vientiane Times 2012c). Other 
major actors from the private sector that have 
demonstrated an interest in developing REDD+ 
activities in Laos include Stora Enso (feasibility 
stage), Oji Paper (feasibility study complete), 
Arcadia Investment Management Corporation 
(feasibility underway), Prime Invest/Sinclair 
Knight Merz (pre-feasibility), Indochina Resort 
Group, Green Planet JSC, and Kyoto Energy Co. 
(Ounekham 2011). Nevertheless, the private sector 
has not had much recent involvement in Laos’ 
REDD+ policy processes, although the private 
sector is ranked second in the list of actors to be 
prioritized for further consultation during the 
R-PP implementation phases.
Other actors shaping REDD+ policy in Laos 
include researchers from the Faculty of Forestry 
of the National University of Laos. Lao scholars 
from the university are engaged in a number 
of international and regional research networks 
studying REDD+, including the EU-funded 
Impacts of REDD+ in Southeast Asia (I-REDD+) 
project, the Sustainable Mekong Research 
Network, Asia-Pacific Network for Sustainable 
Forest Management and Rehabilitation, and the 
Asia-Pacific Network for Global Change Research. 
Finally, although many of the international 
NGOs active in Laos express reservations 
about the potential impacts of REDD+ on 
rural communities’ rights and livelihoods, as 
illustrated in the Final Declaration of the Ninth 
Asia–Europe People’s Forum held in Vientiane 
in October 2012, the REDD+ policy process has 
not witnessed any protest action from CSOs. The 
inactivity of CSOs may be explained partly by their 
weak capacity and partly by the limited experience 
of government agencies in dealing with opinions 
that diverge from formal government statements 
(personal communication from Barney, 2013).
5.3. Current REDD+ consultation 
process
The REDD+ taskforce decided to limit stakeholder 
consultations (see next paragraph) held to prepare 
the R-PP to national-level representatives of 
government, donors, civil society and the private 
sector. Officials from Huaphanh, Luang Prabang 
and Xayaboury Provinces were also consulted 
(CliPAD and PAREDD, which initiated REDD+ 
pilot projects, invited their local counterparts). The 
reasons advanced for limiting consultations related 
to: (1) the need to avoid raising expectations in 
areas not yet targeted for REDD+ activities, (2) 
limited time and funds to conduct consultations at 
subnational levels, (3) the challenges of consulting 
rural communities in remote areas, given their low 
education levels and minimal knowledge about 
climate change, and (4) plans by the CliPAD and 
PAREDD+ projects to conduct consultations at 
the local level. Three main consultations were 
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undertaken in the course of drafting Laos’ R-PP. 
From 7 April to 17 May 2010, 35 interviews 
were conducted with representatives of various 
ministries, Lao nonprofit associations, international 
financial institutions, development agencies 
and NGOs, and selected private enterprises. 
The aims of these interviews were to assess 
awareness and understanding of REDD+ and to 
discuss expectations concerning REDD+ project 
implementation.
Following the interviews, the first national 
consultation workshop was held in Vientiane 
on 25 and 26 May 2010, in combination with a 
high-level meeting chaired by MAF. These two 
events sought to raise awareness about REDD+ 
among key stakeholders and/or policy makers 
at the national level. The high-level meeting 
was attended by about 150 participants from 
key organizations. At the workshop, the 100 or 
so participants contributed to discussions and 
working groups on strategic and policy matters 
related to REDD+ in Laos and the drafting of the 
R-PP. A second national consultation workshop 
was held in Vientiane on 10 and 11 August 2010. 
The workshop was attended by 109 representatives 
of ministries, provincial administrations (Attapeu, 
Bolikhamxay, Xayaboury, Luang Prabang and 
Huaphanh Provinces), Lao mass organizations 
and nonprofit associations, international financial 
institutions, development agencies and NGOs (the 
private sector was excluded because a consultation 
workshop for the private sector was scheduled 
to take place during the implementation of the 
R-PP). The aim of this workshop was to provide 
stakeholders with an overview of the REDD+ 
activities planned for Laos and to elicit additional 
input into the draft R-PP.
Further consultations took place during the 
scoping, joint and technical missions for the 
FIP. A national consultation workshop was held 
by the secretariat of the Lao REDD+ taskforce 
on 20 January 2011, with the aim of sharing 
information about drivers of deforestation and 
ongoing and planned REDD+ activities in Laos. 
The workshop was attended by representatives 
from various government agencies, nonprofit 
associations, private businesses, international 
development agencies and NGOs. On 21 January, 
additional discussions took place among officials 
from the Department of Forest Inspection under 
MAF, a few representatives from Lao nonprofit 
associations and three private companies interested 
in forest carbon (Stora Enso, Oji Paper and Earth 
Systems Laos).
A second national consultation workshop for 
the FIP was held by the Department of Forestry 
on 7 June 2011 to discuss preparations for the 
FIP in detail. Again, the workshop was attended 
by representatives of several ministries and 
governmental agencies (those directly involved in 
FIP-supported activities) along with representatives 
from nonprofit associations, private companies, 
international development agencies and NGOs. 
The main points of discussion included the 
building of national capacity to prepare for the 
FIP, the adoption of a programmatic approach, 
the alignment of FIP activities with national 
forestry policies and laws, and the establishment 
of mechanisms to coordinate FIP activities 
with other development partners and projects. 
Additional discussions took place on 7–9 June 
2011 with representatives from forestry companies 
(Stora Enso and Oji Paper), officials from MAF, 
Ministry of Finance (MoF) and WREA, and 
representatives from nonprofit associations, the 
Public Administration and Civil Service Authority 
and JICA.
A third national consultation workshop on the 
FIP was held in Vientiane on 9 September 2011 
by the Department of Forestry to discuss the key 
themes identified in the draft investment plan and 
the framework for engaging local communities. 
The workshop was attended by approximately 
100 participants from line government agencies, 
officials from the eight target provinces (see Section 
5.2), and representatives of mass organizations, 
nonprofit associations, the private sector, and 
international development agencies and NGOs 
engaged in REDD+ and forestry. This was 
followed by two regional consultation workshops 
in Luang Prabang on 13 September 2011 
(attended by stakeholders from Bokeo, Huaphanh, 
Luang Prabang and Xayaboury Provinces) and 
in Thakhek (Khammuane Province) on 15 
September 2011 (attended by stakeholders from 
Attapeu, Bolikhamxay, Khammuane and Saravane 
Provinces). The aims of these workshops were to 
present and discuss the draft investment plan and 
to identify implementing partners and concrete 
options for using funds at the subnational and 
local levels.
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In addition to these consultations, international 
NGOs, Lao nonprofit associations and operators of 
REDD+ pilot projects have held several workshops 
and forums at the central and subnational levels, 
such as the Lao Biodiversity Association’s national 
and subnational forums on information and 
awareness raising on REDD+, which covered FPIC 
and the potential impacts of REDD+ on local 
communities, and a national workshop supported 
by CliPAD, which focused on opportunities 
and constraints for private sector involvement in 
REDD+ in Laos.
5.4. Future REDD+ policy options and 
processes
5.4.1. Types of REDD+
The R-PP identifies three main activities aimed 
at controlling deforestation, all of which involve 
payments related to forest carbon stocks. The first, 
at the national level, focuses on establishing a 
regulatory framework for carbon-sensitive mining 
and hydropower development. This action would 
build partly on experiences with the Nam Theun 
2 hydropower project in Khammuane Province 
and involve the preparation and implementation 
of biomass removal plans, the restoration of 
forest cover and the monitoring of greenhouse 
gas emissions in and around project sites. Project 
developers and operators are not expected to 
receive REDD+ payments, with REDD+-related 
funding from international sources most likely 
directed toward supporting the government in law 
enforcement and monitoring.
The second activity, aimed at curbing the 
expansion of agriculture and tree plantations 
in existing forests, seeks to improve land-use 
planning and land allocations and leases by using 
information on carbon stocks and values. This 
intervention will take place at the district level, 
with REDD+ payments to be used to support 
activities such as the creation of permanent sample 
plots for forest carbon, setting baselines, and 
monitoring emission reductions. These activities 
could be integrated into existing land-use planning 
and land allocation processes by land-use planning 
projects such as the GIZ-supported project on 
Land Management and Economic Development 
in Rural Areas and the ADB-funded Sustainable 
Natural Resources Management and Productivity 
Enhancement Project.
The third activity is aimed at controlling forest 
conversion. It promotes forest protection, 
regeneration and restoration initiatives by 
smallholders in both village and national 
conservation, production and protection forests. 
REDD+ payments can therefore be distributed 
at the local level, although this will be contingent 
on local communities having a clear definition in 
REDD+ payment. Local plans were being tested 
in villages adjacent to the Nam Phouy NPA in 
Xayaboury Province (CliPAD project), but this 
pilot activity was recently suspended, with plans to 
move CliPAD away from Nam Phouy NPA to be 
based near the district administrative boundary (one 
or two districts) which is a so-called jurisdictional 
approach; local plans are also being piloted in 
16 villages in Luang Prabang Province as part of 
PAREDD.
Laos’ R-PP identifies three additional sets of 
activities for avoided forest degradation that could 
be associated with REDD+ payments. The first 
builds upon the experiences from SUFORD to 
expand sustainable forest management practices 
to all national production forests (around 
3.1 million ha) as well as to sites targeted for 
large-scale infrastructure projects. REDD+ 
payments could be used to clarify production 
forest boundaries, facilitate participation by local 
communities in forestry activities and introduce 
improved timber harvesting techniques, such as 
reduced impact logging, rotational schemes and 
residue management. 
A second set of activities would aim to improve 
surveillance of illegal logging, monitoring of wood 
supply and value chains, and law enforcement. 
REDD+ funds could be used to support national 
surveys on wood consumption, processing and trade 
as well as district-level activities such as intelligence 
operations, forest rangers and better registration of 
timber harvesting and transportation machinery.
The third strategy focuses more specifically 
on regulating shifting cultivation, which the 
government still views as a major cause of forest 
degradation. Activities here would include greater 
research on alternatives to shifting cultivation, 
such as combinations of agricultural extension 
and private sector efforts to promote contract 
farming for tree plantations/agroforestry in shifting 
cultivation areas. These activities would be partly 
supported by REDD+ payments and conducted 
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at the district level as a complement to improved 
village land-use planning interventions (see second 
paragraph of this section). 
5.4.2. Financing
The government of Laos favors a flexible financing 
strategy for REDD+ implementation. The 
Lao delegation at COP 15 in December 2009 
emphasized its support for multilateral approaches 
to REDD+ financing and its openness to market-
based approaches:
Flexibility is the most important element for 
financing REDD+ in Laos. At this stage, Laos 
prefers to build readiness for REDD+ with 
bilateral relationships with donors, given the 
extensive capacity building which is required 
within the readiness phase. As a participating 
country within the FCPF, Laos also supports 
multilateral approaches for financing. In the 
hope to keep financing flexible, particularly 
within the UNFCCC, Laos supports the 
hybrid approach to financing which means 
financing REDD+ can come from both 
funds and market based approaches. Laos 
is also interested in opportunities within 
the voluntary market to support sustainable 
project based approaches to REDD. 
(GoL 2011a, 46)
This position is reflected in the diversity of 
financial partnership agreements that currently 
support REDD+ policy development and 
implementation in Laos. Indeed, REDD+ in Laos 
is supported by multilateral financial institutions 
such as the World Bank, the International Finance 
Corporation and the ADB (through the FCPF 
and FIP), bilateral development banks such 
as BMZ/KfW (CliPAD and CarBi), bilateral 
cooperation agencies such as JICA, GIZ and 
USAID (PAREDD, CliPAD and LEAF) and 
international NGOs such as WWF (CarBi). In 
addition, private companies such as the New Chip 
Xeng Group are financing REDD+-related public–
private partnerships (Sub-National Reduction of 
Deforestation and Forest Degradation project).
5.4.3. Monitoring, reporting and verification
The first attempt at setting a national REL for 
Laos was made by the Department of Forestry 
while drafting the R-PP. This initial REL was 
based on the assessment of historical values of 
deforestation and degradation measured between 
1982 and 2001 (land cover and forest inventory 
data). It also incorporated the impacts of the 
national development plans and economic growth 
for post-2002 values (see Section 2.3). The most 
recent national forest cover data (for 2010) and 
the second national forest inventory, currently 
underway, are expected to provide additional 
information to improve this estimate of the 
national REL. The Department of Forestry is 
planning to improve the model and develop 
RELs at the provincial level, with funding from 
the FCPF. International agencies such as WCS 
and GIZ, which are guiding the design and 
establishment of Laos’ MRV system, are exploring 
possibilities for including existing data sets or 
investing in new data sets to establish a reasonably 
accurate REL and to introduce MRV in Huaphanh 
Province.
The government of Laos appears to favor a 
jurisdictional and nested approach to REDD+, 
although no official decisions have been made 
in this regard. The perceived benefit of this 
approach is that it can allow for a diverse range of 
REDD+ initiatives, thus allowing both national 
and individual REDD+ activities. The National 
REDD+ Office would develop and administer a 
wall-to-wall national MRV system, which would 
require national forest cover mapping and forest 
inventory approximately every 2 years. Then, 
provincial REDD+ offices would be responsible 
for ground-truthing national results, such as by 
conducting forest inventories, and compiling 
reports at the provincial level. Provincial REDD+ 
offices would also develop provincial REDD+ 
strategies, in collaboration with relevant offices 
and authorities, and integrate them into other 
sector strategies. Projects run by private companies 
and/or NGOs would likely be included either 
under VCS jurisdiction methodologies at the 
subnational level or as standalone projects in 
nonregistered jurisdictions. For all projects, 
whatever methodologies are used, there is a need 
to incorporate institutional capacity building and 
activity implementation at the subnational level. 
The poor capacity for MRV at the subnational 
level calls for considerable technical assistance 
and capacity building. Investment will also be 
needed to support the development of verification 
standards and the accreditation of independent 
organizations responsible for verification and 
certification.
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5.4.4. Benefit sharing
There is a lack of clear proposals for REDD+ 
benefit sharing in Laos. Organizations such as GIZ 
and WCS have positioned themselves as central 
on this issue. CliPAD, initially using funds from 
KfW, includes plans to design and experiment 
with benefit-sharing mechanisms for REDD+ in 
pilot sites in Xayaboury and Huaphanh Provinces. 
CliPAD is also supporting the revision of Laos’ 
Forestry Law through a review of legislative and 
institutional frameworks related to forest resources. 
However, as indicated in Laos’ FIP investment 
plan, the revision of the Forestry Law is expected 
to provide guidance on REDD+ benefit sharing 
in Laos.
Consideration of co-benefits has not been largely 
debated, while demonstration projects are aiming 
to obtain Climate, Community and
Biodiversity (CCB) certification. The R-PP 
addresses this question only very superficially, by 
merely mentioning the existence of co-benefits and 
the need to monitor them. However, Laos’ FIP 
investment plan lists several co-benefits associated 
with REDD+ activities and proposes to integrate 
indicators into its results framework, such as 
household incomes, tenure security, ethnic and 
gender balances in access to resources and decision 
making, and habitat fragmentation.
5.4.5. Proposed participation mechanisms
Consultations conducted within the framework 
of the FCPF and FIP have continued to focus 
essentially on the national and (to a lesser extent) 
provincial levels. However, the government 
of Laos recognizes the need to expand future 
consultation and participation mechanisms to 
encompass lower administrative levels, including 
district and village levels. As described in the 
R-PP and FIP investment plan, a “Stakeholder 
Participation and Consultation” working group 
under the supervision of the National REDD+ 
Office will set the overall national strategy on 
consultation and participation in REDD+ in 
Laos  (see Section 5.4.6). This working group 
will be responsible for developing a detailed 
work plan on REDD+ readiness preparation, 
identifying partner organizations to conduct 
information-pipeline and consultation activities, 
and developing and disseminating awareness-
raising and training materials on forest carbon 
management and REDD+. In general, subnational 
activities targeting consultation and enhanced 
participation are expected to be in areas where 
pilot REDD+ activities are planned and build 
upon existing administrative channels linking 
provinces and districts to villages. In particular, 
Technical Service Centers, which are agriculture 
and forestry extension units recently formed at the 
village cluster level, are expected to play a key role 
in the process.
5.4.6. Policies and institutions
Implementing REDD+ in Laos will therefore 
require that new institutions and agencies be 
created at various levels. For instance, the National 
REDD+ Office is established at the Department 
of Forestry and subnational REDD+ Offices at the 
provincial level are also under planning (Figure 4). 
The main role of the National REDD+ Office is to 
coordinate with working groups on RELs, MRV, 
consultation and participation, and benefit-sharing 
schemes. The main role of subnational REDD+ 
offices at the provincial level is to implement 
REDD+ activities at province, district and lower 
levels. In the future, the National REDD+ 
Taskforce will also include representatives of the 
private sector and CSOs active at the national 
and provincial levels. Important legal reforms 
pertaining to forest carbon tenure, financing and 
benefit sharing, among others, will be included in 
the revision of the Forestry Law.
Although officials from WREA (now under 
MoNRE) participated in UNFCCC events, 
the Department of Forestry (under MAF) has 
been leading the development of REDD+ policy 
and strategy in Laos. The creation of MoNRE 
in 2011 and the transfer of responsibilities for 
conservation and protection forests from MAF 
to the new ministry have led to some uncertainty 
over leadership and coordination within REDD+ 
policy development. The institutional restructuring 
caused the delay of many REDD+-related 
activities. Furthermore, although the Department 
of Forest Resource Management (under MoNRE) 
has a legal mandate to make decisions concerning 
REDD+, it lacks the necessary staff and capacity, 
and no REDD+ projects have yet been assigned 
to the department. Instead, almost all REDD+ 
demonstration projects have been assigned to the 
National REDD+ Office (within the Department 
of Forestry), which does have some staff capacity. 
MoNRE has yet to become involved in REDD+, 
whereas MAF is currently responsible for all 
REDD+ decision making.
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5.4.7. Policy learning
Government policies aimed at combating 
deforestation have generally not been reviewed 
in light of lessons learned from previous 
experiences. However, that such policies are 
overly ambitious has become clear, with REDD+ 
apparently brought into the debate as a result. 
As discussed in Section 5.1, the government of 
Laos sees REDD+ as a potentially important 
source of technical and financial support for 
its longstanding afforestation and reforestation 
objectives. This position, repeated throughout 
Laos’ R-PP, stems essentially from the recognition 
that, despite the country’s efforts to reshape 
forest governance, national policies and programs 
to curb deforestation and forest degradation 
have been hindered by the persistent lack of 
human and financial capacity for implementation, 
monitoring and law enforcement.
In addition, with the REDD+ taskforce established 
only at the national level with members from 
national institutions, there are no formal 
mechanisms to use local experiences from pilot 
projects to inform the national REDD+ policy 
process. However, as most operators of pilot 
REDD+ projects, such as GIZ, WCS and JICA, 
also advise and train the central government 
agencies overseeing national REDD+ strategy and 
policy, they can be considered direct brokers of 
information, helping the information to flow from 
the local level (pilot projects) and the international 
level (multilateral debates and negotiations around 
REDD+) to the national level.
Figure 4. Planned institutional arrangements for REDD+ in Laos.
Source: GoL (2010b)
Implications for the 3Es
and forest degradation are driven by small-scale 
agricultural expansion, agribusiness and industrial 
forestry concessions, and mining, hydropower and 
other infrastructure development. The success of 
REDD+ policies in Laos will therefore depend 
largely on their effectiveness in integrating and 
coordinating operations across sectors, institutions 
and management levels. We use a 3E framework 
to assess four key aspects that will significantly 
influence the outcomes of REDD+ in Laos: (1) 
cross-sectoral coordination, (2) institutional 
arrangements and governance, (3) MRV and (4) 
benefit sharing and participation (see Table 9).
6.1. Strengthening cross-sectoral 
coordination
Effective implementation of REDD+ will require 
strong engagement and coordination across the 
agriculture, forestry, mining, energy, infrastructure, 
investment and planning sectors. To date, REDD+ 
policy development has been largely dominated 
by forestry experts. Even though government 
negotiators from WREA (now under MoNRE) 
attended COP meetings, they generally played a 
very minor role in REDD+ policy development. 
Rather, the development of national REDD+ 
policies and strategies has remained largely under 
the leadership of the Department of Forestry 
under MAF. The Department of Forestry has not 
only been active in leading the national policy 
development, but has also been participating in key 
regional and international discussions on REDD+.
The need for a more inclusive and integrated 
approach was recognized in the development of 
Laos’ R-PP and efforts have been made to expand 
membership of the REDD+ taskforce beyond the 
forestry sector:
6
In this section, we consider the main implications 
of the context in Laos for achieving effectiveness, 
efficiency and equity (the “3Es”) in REDD+. 
Here, “effectiveness” refers to the magnitude of 
the reduction in carbon emissions, defined as the 
difference between the volume of emissions with 
and without REDD+ interventions. Assessing 
effectiveness therefore requires (1) accurate and 
verifiable measurements of actual emissions with 
REDD+, (2) predictions of what would have 
happened without REDD+ and (3) estimates 
of potentially undesirable side effects in space 
(leakage) and time (permanence) and on other 
mitigation activities. “Efficiency” refers to whether 
the emission reductions are achieved at minimum 
cost. Costs for implementing REDD+ include 
establishment of technical and governance 
structures, capacity building, transaction costs for 
activities such as monitoring, law enforcement and 
tenure reforms, and opportunity costs incurred 
by land users in avoiding land conversions. 
“Equity” has three main dimensions (McDermott 
et al. 2012): (1) distributive equity includes fair 
repartition of REDD+ benefits between and 
within stakeholder groups and local communities; 
(2) procedural equity refers to fairness in the 
processes set up to allocate resources and resolve 
disputes, which requires recognition of all parties, 
inclusion, representation and participation in 
decision making; and (3) contextual equity takes 
into account the uneven playing field in forest 
governance, namely imbalance in the capabilities 
and power of different stakeholder groups, that 
prevents some people from fully participating.
The success of REDD+ policies will depend on 
whether they address the main causes of change in 
forest carbon stocks. In most developing countries 
— including Laos — drivers of deforestation 
originate largely from outside the forestry sector 
(Hosonuma et al. 2012). In Laos, deforestation 
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In order to engage all sectors involved in 
REDD+ and related climate change issues, 
membership of the National Environment 
Committee will be broadened to include other 
sectors not currently represented, especially 
the National Land Management Authorities 
(current MoNRE). The REDD+ task force 
will be strengthened by additional members 
from other key ministries including Finance, 
Planning and Investment, Mines and Energy. 
(GoL 2011a, 15)
The transfer of the responsibility for conservation 
and protection forests from MAF to MoNRE have 
led to unstable power relations, unclear mandates 
and poor coordination between these two key 
ministries involved in the REDD+ policy process. A 
programmatic approach across all sectors and clear 
coordination of development partners and projects 
are prerequisites for achieving REDD+ objectives. 
Although the Forestry Law and Land Law were 
initially being revised in concert, in what seemed to 
be an example of the necessary alignment, the two 
processes have since evolved independently, which 
may have negative consequences for REDD+ and 
weaken or obscure the necessary synergies between 
land and forest policies.
6.2. Reducing the gap between policy 
and practice
The government of Laos will have to address the 
issue of weak enforcement of laws and regulations 
before implementing REDD+. Significant initial 
investments to strengthen governance and build 
institutional capacity will be needed if national 
policies and measures aimed at reducing the loss 
of forest carbon are to be effective. On the one 
hand, weak forest governance, collusion, corruption 
and patron–client relationships are key indirect 
drivers of illegal logging and unsustainable timber 
extraction in Laos — the main causes of forest 
degradation. To enhance REDD+ effectiveness 
and cost efficiency, large upfront investments will 
be required to build the capacity of administrative 
and technical staff, to raise awareness and to 
enforce existing laws and regulations. On the other 
hand, to avoid deforestation, land-use planning 
and land allocation processes need to be aligned 
and local communities’ land tenure rights must 
be secured, given the widespread land acquisition 
by agribusinesses (see Section 2.2). Stakeholder 
consultation and planning, coordination between 
national and provincial levels, and the testing of 
improved measurement and monitoring systems 
at all levels should therefore be prioritized. New 
mechanisms (e.g., FLEGT) and investment 
schemes (e.g., FIP) under discussion could give the 
government the support it needs to implement its 
regulations.
6.3. Setting correct crediting 
baselines and defining conditions for 
additionality
National and subnational crediting baselines are 
important considerations for cost efficiency. On 
the one hand, an incorrect baseline may allow 
some stakeholders to claim carbon credits for 
results that would have occurred anyway. On 
the other hand, stakeholders’ efforts to control 
deforestation may not be properly recognized if 
unforeseen demand drives illegal logging beyond 
expectations. 
The additionality of REDD+ measures may 
be difficult to demonstrate in a context where 
relevant policies and regulations are in place 
but cannot be enforced because of a lack of 
capacity and/or resources. REDD+ may create 
an additional incentive to implement existing 
policies, by serving as an umbrella for the many 
projects that can contribute to achieving carbon 
emission reductions through avoided deforestation 
and forest degradation, as well as co-benefits 
such as biodiversity conservation and improved 
livelihoods.
Any performance assessment must consider the 
tools used to measure performance and how they 
can be adapted to local contexts. It is often difficult 
to disentangle the multiple factors underlying 
land-use change, such as investment opportunities, 
land policies, law enforcement and poverty traps. 
“To which factors should the observed phenomena 
be ultimately attributed?”, “Who is responsible 
for failure?”, “Who should be credited with the 
success and avoided carbon emissions?” — these 
are questions that defy easy answers in real-life 
situations. Simple explanations of the relationships 
among factors are likely to be the exception rather 
than the rule. Hence, it is necessary to consider 
how these relationships are influenced by local 
contexts and, crucially, to adapt performance 
measurements to the particular context in which 
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REDD+ is implemented (Lestrelin et al. 2013). 
As the context can significantly influence the 
effectiveness of policy options aimed at avoiding 
deforestation and forest degradation, context-
sensitive approaches to performance assessment are 
essential.
6.4. Ensuring distributive, procedural 
and contextual equity
The relevance and consequently the overall 
performance of REDD+ will be boosted if 
local communities and civil society participate 
in designing and implementing local REDD+ 
architectures (see Section 3.1). Participation is also 
needed to create fair benefit-sharing mechanisms 
(Section 3.2). Procedural equity, therefore, is 
expected to improve distributive equity and 
avoid the potential capture of REDD+ benefits 
by national or local elites. The aim of FPIC is to 
give communities sufficient information, time 
and experience to allow them to participate 
effectively in REDD+ consultation, design and 
implementation (Anderson 2011), by empowering 
local communities and increasing equity, so that 
they can identify, defend and pursue their interests. 
However, a major difficulty with enhancing 
community participation is that operators 
implementing REDD+ are reluctant to raise 
expectations if these ultimately cannot be met. The 
FPIC regime envisaged in international REDD+ 
negotiations is difficult to operationalize on the 
ground given the lack of clarity about REDD+ 
architecture and processes, that is, the content 
of the message is not yet clear. In addition, those 
in the field, such as district officers from District 
Agriculture and Forestry Offices and Departments 
of Natural Resources and Environment, lack the 
methods and skills to adapt their message to local 
circumstances, which might require, for example, 
engaging marginalized groups such as upland 
ethnic minorities and women.
In any case, benefit-sharing mechanisms and 
carbon rights need to be clarified before local 
communities can be engaged through FPIC. As 
discussed in Section 3.3, carbon rights may be 
linked to land rights, although local populations 
may derive little benefit from this, as carbon-rich 
areas are generally under state management (state 
protection and conservation forests) (Bourgoin 
et al. 2013). Poor tenure security and hence lack 
of ability to exclude land concessions and state 
development projects may further marginalize 
forest-dependent populations, so it is essential to 
ensure the equity of REDD+ schemes through 
the allocation of strong forest tenure and carbon 
rights to local communities. Stakeholders at all 
levels should respect the legality of village PLUP 
agreements, signed by district governors, to prevent 
land grabbing. In addition, locally controlled 
forestry initiatives should engage people living 
in or near state-managed carbon-rich forests —
families, communities and indigenous peoples — 
in maintaining the forest resources on which they 
depend. These communities could be rewarded for 
their long-term stewardship of state forested land 
with a share of the carbon credits generated by 
avoiding forest loss while enhancing livelihoods. 
Finally, high priority should be given to clarifying 
and securing land and carbon rights and to 
improving forest governance through targeted 
investments and capacity-building activities, if “3E 
REDD+” is to be achieved in Laos.
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Table 9. 3E assessment of key aspects of REDD+ in Laos.
Main aspects Effectiveness (carbon) Efficiency (costs) Equity and co-benefits
Institutions • National ownership of 
the REDD+ agenda: high-
level commitment but 
implementation challenges still 
to be addressed
• The private sector is involved 
in REDD+ consultations. Also 
explores implementation 
mechanisms through REDD+ 
project feasibility studies
• Policies that address 
deforestation and forest 
degradation (e.g., Land and 
Forestry Laws) are being 
revised to better accommodate 
REDD+
• Limited capacity to cope 
with increased volumes 
of finance. Administrative 
processes are slow and will 
remain cumbersome as 
long as the mandate of each 
institution involved is not 
clarified
• Civil society involved in law 
revision consultations and 
increasing role in REDD+ 
(e.g., Land Issues Working 
Group)
• Requirement for stronger 
law enforcement, 
especially to secure land 
and carbon rights for 
local communities and 
indigenous people
• Lack of transparency and 
accountability mechanisms
• Poor capacity and lack of 
field methods to improve 
local participation and 
consultation
Coordination • Vertical (between national, 
provincial and local levels) 
and horizontal (cross-sectoral) 
institutional coordination 
remain major challenges for 
REDD+ implementation
• Level of understanding of 
REDD+ implications at the 
subnational level needs to be 
improved so that coordination 
can become effective
• Clarification of institutional 
responsibilities is a 
prerequisite for coordination
• Alignment of policy 
processes is required to 
develop a supportive policy 
environment for REDD+ 
implementation
• Alignment with other 
mitigation strategies (e.g., 
NAMAs) is not clear 
• Transaction costs could 
be reduced by improved 
coordination, which 
would lower the burden 
on some key actors (e.g., 
village chiefs required to 
attend multiple workshops 
on similar topics by 
uncoordinated projects; 
PLUP by different agencies 
cannot be reconciled)
Capacity for 
MRV
• Reference levels still under 
development represent a 
constraint on MRV
• Lack of reliable carbon data at 
the national level. Inventories 
currently underway may 
provide results in the near 
future
• Coordination mechanisms 
are not in place, no national 
organization with the capacity 
to monitor
• Data are generated 
by different projects/
institutions — requires good 
coordination, harmonization
• Comparison of time series 
of remote sending data are 
complicated by the use of 
different standards between 
years
• Human capacity needs 
to be further developed 
and synergies built across 
agencies involved in MRV
• Efforts to involve local 
communities in monitoring 
are limited. Need to be 
strengthened so that 
communities can take part 
in MRV
Benefit 
sharing and 
participation
• Consensus reached on the 
principle of participation of all 
stakeholder groups (including 
local communities) in REDD+ 
design and implementation
• However, practical aspects 
of participation need to be 
defined and shared among 
partners
• Fiduciary systems necessary 
to deliver REDD+ benefits 
need to be developed
• Benefit-sharing mechanisms 
should be defined through 
widespread consultation 
to avoid implementation 
problems
• Lessons should be learned 
from pilot projects, such 
as SUFORD on production 
forest governance or PES 
initiatives
• Legal aspects related to 
tenure and registration of 
land, carbon rights and 
associated forest resources 
should be clarified through 
widespread consultation
Conclusion and policy 
recommendations
agents and institutions involved in deforestation 
and forest degradation in Laos highlights several 
critical issues that need to be addressed in policy 
discussions.
In the context of weak land and forest governance 
that dominates in Laos, there is a strong need 
for clearer mandates and enhanced coordination 
among REDD+ actors, particularly MAF, MoNRE 
and the departments within these ministries 
responsible for overseeing land and forest policy. 
The development of regulations and mechanisms 
to strengthen both horizontal (cross-sectoral) 
and vertical (national–local) coordination could 
assist in reducing gaps between policy and 
practice, limiting transaction costs, and increasing 
transparency in decision making. Coordination 
is also very important for additionality and 
consistency in crediting baselines at both national 
and subnational levels. The additionality of 
REDD+ may be difficult to demonstrate in a 
context where relevant policies and regulations are 
endorsed but cannot be implemented because of 
institutional confusion and uncertainty. 
The development of context-sensitive and 
participatory approaches to measuring the 
performance of REDD+ interventions is another 
important task that will require enhanced 
coordination. In particular, coordination between 
administrative units and across administrative 
levels will constitute a key challenge to efforts 
to achieve the government’s preference for a 
jurisdictional, nested REDD+ approach. Finally, 
high priority should be given to clarification of 
land and carbon rights. As most carbon-rich areas 
are under state management, national land and 
forest tenure reform may be necessary to avoid 
marginalizing local communities and to ensure that 
REDD+ schemes are equitable.
7
The government of Laos has long viewed 
deforestation and forest degradation as important 
policy issues. However, the various regulations 
and land reform and planning programs created to 
address deforestation and forest degradation have 
met with little success. Recently, the government’s 
adoption of its “turning land into capital” strategy 
— designed to boost private land investment and 
development in order to increase national revenue 
and generate sufficient capital and technology 
to modernize rural land uses — has intensified 
the pressure on forest resources. This pressure on 
Laos’ forest resources is evident through the steady 
decline in national forest cover, from 49% of the 
country’s land area in 1982 to 40% in 2010.
REDD+ found a place in the national policy 
debate in 2007, and the government of Laos sees 
it as a potentially important source of the technical 
and financial support the country needs to achieve 
its afforestation and reforestation objective of 
70% national forest cover by 2020. The National 
REDD+ Taskforce was established in November 
2008 and, since 2010, numerous multilateral and 
bilateral projects have been providing Laos with 
institutional, technical and financial support to 
design a national strategy and framework and 
introduce subnational pilot REDD+ activities. 
The private sector is also supporting the creation 
of public–private partnerships around REDD+. 
Nevertheless, progress in designing and establishing 
an appropriate institutional, policy and regulatory 
environment for REDD+ has been relatively slow 
to date. With the exception of a broadly defined 
institutional architecture linking the National 
Environmental Council to the National REDD+ 
Taskforce and REDD+ offices at the central and 
provincial levels, most REDD+ policy options, for 
example on setting RELs, MRV, benefit sharing 
and participation, continue to be concentrated at 
the central level. Our review of the main drivers, 
References
Barney K and Canby K. 2011. EU FLEGT baseline 
study 2, Lao PDR: Overview of forest governance, 
markets and trade. Kuala Lumpur: European 
Forest Institute, FLEGT Asia. http://www.
euflegt.efi.int/files/attachments/euflegt/
baseline_study_laos_report_en.pdf
Bestari NG, Mongcopa CJ, Samson J and Ward 
K. 2006. Lao PDR: Governance issues in 
agriculture and natural resources. Manila: Asian 
Development Bank.
Bourgoin J, Castella JC, Hett C, Lestrelin G 
and Heinimann A. 2013. Engaging local 
communities in low emissions land use 
planning: A case study from Laos. Ecology & 
Society 18(2):9.
Brockhaus M and Di Gregorio M. 2012. A brief 
overview: Component 1 on national REDD+ 
policies and processes. InfoBrief No.13. Bogor, 
Indonesia: CIFOR.
Brockhaus M, Di Gregorio M and Wertz-
Kanounnikoff S. 2012. Guide for country 
profiles: Global Comparative Study on REDD 
(GCS-REDD) Component 1 on National 
REDD+ Policies and Processes. Bogor, 
Indonesia: CIFOR.
Castella JC, Lestrelin G, Hett C, Bourgoin J, 
Fitriana YR, Heinimann A and Pfund JL. 2013. 
Effects of landscape segregation on livelihood 
vulnerability: Moving from extensive shifting 
cultivation to rotational agriculture and natural 
forests in northern Laos. Human Ecology 
41(1):63–76.
Chazee L. 1994. Shifting cultivation practices 
in Laos: Present systems and their future., 
Vientiane: UN Development Programme 
and Lao Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry. 
http://lad.nafri.org.la/download_file.
php?id=517
Chokkalingam U. 2010. Design Options for a Forest 
Carbon Legal Framework for Lao PDR: Drawing 
Lessons from Across the Globe. Vientiane: GIZ.
8
Anderson P. 2011. Free, Prior, and Informed 
Consent: Principles and Approaches for 
Policy and Project Development. Bangkok: 
RECOFTC and GIZ.
Anonymous. 2000. Aspects of forestry 
management in the Lao PDR. Watershed 
5(3):57–64. www.terraper.org/mainpage/
images/water/130992642939_index.pdf
Aubertin C. 2003. La forêt laotienne redessinée par 
les politiques environnementales. Bois et Forêts 
des Tropiques 278(4):39–50.
Baird I. 2010a. Land, rubber and people: Rapid 
agrarian changes and responses in southern 
Laos. Journal of Lao Studies 1(1):1–47.
Baird I. 2010b. Quotas, Powers, Patronage and 
Illegal Rent-Seeking: The Political Economy 
of Logging and the Timber Trade in Southern 
Laos. Washington, DC: Forest Trends. 
http://forest-trends.org/publication_details.
php?publicationID=2421
Baird IG. 2011. Turning land into capital, turning 
people into labor: Primitive accumulation 
and the arrival of large-scale economic land 
concessions in the Lao People’s Democratic 
Republic. New Proposals: Journal of Marxism 
and Interdisciplinary Inquiry 5(1):10–26.
Baird IG and Shoemaker B. 2007. Unsettling 
experiences: Internal resettlement and 
international aid agencies in Laos. Development 
and Change 38(5):865–888.
Barney K. 2007. The trouble with tenure security 
in Laos. Watershed 12(2):57–64.
Barney K. 2009. Laos and the making of a 
“relational” resource frontier. Geographical 
Journal 175(2):146–159.
Barney K. 2010. Large acquisition of rights on forest 
lands: Focus on Lao PDR. Report for Rights 
and Resources Initiative (unpublished).
Barney K. 2011. Grounding global forest economies: 
Resource governance and commodity power in 
rural Laos [PhD thesis]. Toronto, Canada: 
York University.
The context of REDD+ in the Lao People’s Democratic Republic | 47
Ducourtieux O, Laffort J-R and Sacklokham 
S. 2005. Land policy and farming 
practices in Laos. Development and Change 
36(3):499– 526.
Dwyer M. 2007. Turning Land into Capital: A 
Review of Recent Research on Land Concessions 
for Investment in the Lao PDR. Vientiane: 
iNGO Working Group on Land Issues.
Dwyer M. 2011. Building the politics machine: Tools 
for resolving the global land grab. Presentation, 
International Conference on Global Land 
Grabbing. Institute of Development Studies, 
University of Sussex, 6–8 April.
 [EIA] Environmental Investigation Agency. 2011. 
Crossroads: The Illicit Timber Trade Between 
Laos and Vietnam. London: Environmental 
Investigation Agency. http://www.eia-
international.org/wp-content/uploads/EIA-
Crossroads-report-FINAL-low.pdf 
[EIA] Environmental Investigation Agency. 2012. 
Checkpoints: How Powerful Interest Groups 
Continue to Undermine Forest Governance in 
Laos. London: Environmental Investigation 
Agency.
[EIA] Environmental Investigation Agency/
Telapak. 2008. Borderlines: Vietnam’s Booming 
Furniture Industry and Timber Smuggling in the 
Mekong Region. London and Bogor, Indonesia: 
Environmental Investigation Agency and 
Telapak.
Evrard O. 2004. La mise en œuvre de la réforme 
foncière au Laos: Impacts sociaux et effets sur les 
conditions de vie en milieu rural. Rome: Food 
and Agriculture Organization of the United 
Nations.
Evrard O and Goudineau Y. 2004. Planned 
resettlement, unexpected migrations and 
cultural trauma in Laos. Development and 
Change 35(5):937–962.
[FAO] Food and Agriculture Organization of the 
United Nations. 2010. Global forest resources 
assessment 2010: Main report. FAO Forestry 
Paper 163. Rome: Food and Agriculture 
Organization of the United Nations. www.fao.
org/docrep/013/i1757e/i1757e.pdf 
[FAO] Food and Agriculture Organization of 
the United Nations. 2011. The State of 
Forests in the Amazon Basin, Congo Basin and 
Southeast Asia. Rome: Food and Agriculture 
Organization of the United Nations. www.fao.
org/docrep/014/i2247e/i2247e00.pdf
[FCPF] Forest Carbon Partnership Facility. 2012. 
REDD+ readiness progress fact sheet: Lao PDR, 
October 2012. Washington, DC: Forest 
Carbon Partnership Facility, World Bank. 
www.forestcarbonpartnership.org/fcp/sites/
forestcarbonpartnership.org/files/Documents/
PDF/Oct2012/Lao%20FCPF%20
REDD%20Readiness%20Progress%20Sheet_
October%202012.pdf
[FoF] Faculty of Forestry. 2008. An environmental 
impact assessment of additional financing for 
the Sustainable Forestry for Rural Development 
project (SUFORD). Vientiane: Faculty of 
Forestry, National University of Laos.
Foppes J. 2008. Agriculture and Forestry 
Development at “Kum Ban” Village Cluster Level 
in Lao PDR. Vientiane: National Agriculture 
and Forestry Extension Service.
Forest Trends/[DFID] Department for 
International Development. 2010. Timber 
Markets and Trade Between Laos and Vietnam: 
A Commodity Chain Analysis of Vietnamese-
Driven Timber Flows. Washington, DC: Forest 
Trends; London: Department for International 
Development (DFID). www.forest-trends.org/
documents/files/doc_2365.pdf 
Fox JM. 2000. How blaming “slash and 
burn” farmers is deforesting mainland 
Southeast Asia. Asia Pacific Issues: Analysis 
from the East-West Center 47:1–8. http://
scholarspace.manoa.hawaii.edu/bitstream/
handle/10125/3832/api047.pdf?sequence=1 
Fraser A, Korhonen T and Southavilay T. 2009. 
Restructuring the wood industry. Presentation 
to the Department of Forestry, Ministry of 
Agriculture and Forestry, Lao PDR. 
Fujita Y and Phanvilay K. 2008. Land and 
forest allocation in Lao People’s Democratic 
Republic: Comparison of case studies 
from community-based natural resource 
management research. Society & Natural 
Resources 21(2):120–133.
[GoL] Government of Laos. 1996. The Forestry 
Law. Adopted by the National Assembly 11 
October 1996; promulgated by the President 
of the State 2 November 1996; effective 2 
November 1996. Unofficial Translation by 
Dirksen Flipse Doran & Le, Lawyers & 
Counsellors
[GoL] Government of Laos. 2001. Fifth National 
Socioeconomic Development Plan (2001–2005). 
Vientiane: Committee for Planning and 
Investment, Government of Lao PDR.
48 | Lestrelin G, Trockenbrodt M, Phanvilay K, Thongmanivong S, Vongvisouk T, Pham TT and Castella J-C. 
[GoL] Government of Laos. 2005a. Forest Strategy 
to the Year 2020 of the Lao PDR. Vientiane: 
Department of Forestry, Ministry of 
Agriculture and Forestry, Government of Lao 
PDR. www.forestcarbonasia.org/wp-content/
uploads/2011/10/2.-Forestry-Strategy-to-the-
Year-2020-of-the-Lao-PDR.pdf
[GoL] Government of Laos. 2005b. Report on 
the Assessment of Forest Cover and Land Use 
during 1992–2002. Vientiane: Department of 
Forestry, Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry, 
Government of Lao PDR.
[GoL] Government of Laos. 2006. Sixth National 
Socioeconomic Development Plan (2006–2010). 
Vientiane: Committee for Planning and 
Investment, Government of Lao PDR. http://
www.undplao.org/newsroom/ngpes.php
[GoL] Government of Laos. 2007a. Forestry 
Law No. 6/NA. English Version. Translation 
Endorsed by the Law Committee of the 
National Assembly of the Lao PDR. http://
www.forestcarbonasia.org/wp-content/
uploads/2011/10/1.-Forestry-Law-No-
6NA. pdf 
[GoL] Government of Laos. 2007b. Forestry Sector 
Development Report 2006/07 for the First 
Stakeholder Consultation on Forestry Strategy 
2020 Implementation. Vientiane: Ministry of 
Agriculture and Forestry.
[GoL] Government of Laos. 2008. Policy Brief 
No. 2: Rural Land Management and Land 
Administration. Vientiane: Ministry of 
Agriculture and Forestry, Sub-Working Group 
on Uplands Development.
[GoL] Government of Laos. 2009. Report 
Implementation Status of Forestry Strategy 
2020 and MAF 5 Year Plan for 8th Meeting of 
GOL-Donor Sub-working Group on Forestry. 
Unpublished.
[GoL] Government of Laos. 2010a. Strategy 
for Agricultural Development 2011 to 2020. 
Vientiane: Government of Lao PDR. http://
www.forestcarbonasia.org/wp-content/
uploads/2011/10/3.-Strategy-for-Agricultural-
Development-2011-to-2020.pdf
[GoL] Government of Laos. 2010b. Seventh 
National Socioeconomic Development Plan 
(2011–2015). Vientiane: Ministry of Planning 
and Investment, Government of Lao PDR.
[GoL] Government of Laos. 2010c. Ministerial 
Instruction to prepare for the complete stopping 
of the slash and burn, and shifting cultivation 
in 2010 (0022/MAF). Ministry of Agriculture 
and Forestry, Government of Lao PDR.
[GoL] Government of Laos. 2010d. Forest 
Carbon Partnership Facility (FCPF) Readiness 
Preparation Proposal (R-PP) Lao PDR. 
Vientiane: Department of Forestry, Ministry 
of Agriculture and Forestry, Government of 
Lao PDR. http://www.forestcarbonpartnership.
org/fcp/sites/forestcarbonpartnership.org/files/
Documents/PDF/Oct2010/Lao_R-PP_Final_
draft_revised_11_OCT_2010_Clean.pdf 
[GoL] Government of Laos. 2010e. National 
Strategy on Climate Change. Vientiane: 
Government of Lao PDR.
[GoL] Government of Laos. 2011a. Annual 
Review of REDD+ Activities in Lao PDR 2010. 
Vientiane: Department of Forestry, Ministry of 
Agriculture and Forestry, Government of Lao 
PDR. www.forestcarbonasia.org/wp-content/
uploads/2011/05/Annual-Review-of-REDD+-
Activities-in-Lao-PDR-2010.pdf
[GoL] Government of Laos. 2011b. Forest 
Investment Program. Lao Investment Plan. 
Master Draft: 19 September 2011. Vientiane: 
Department of Forestry, Ministry of 
Agriculture and Forestry, Government of 
Lao PDR. http://www.forestcarbonasia.org/
wp-content/uploads/2011/10/1.-Forest-
Investment-Program-Lao-PDR.pdf 
[GoL] Government of Laos. 2011c. Electric 
Power Plants in Laos, July 2011. Vientiane: 
Department of Energy Promotion and 
Development, Ministry of Energy and Mines, 
Government of Lao PDR. http://www.
poweringprogress.org/index.php?option=com_
jotloader&task=files.download&cid=376 
[GoL] Government of Laos. 2012. Lao Census of 
Agriculture 2010/11. Vientiane: Department of 
Planning, Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry, 
Government of Lao PDR.
Goldman M. 2001. Constructing an environmental 
state: Eco-governmentality and other 
transnational practices of a “green” World 
Bank. Social Problems 48(4):499–523.
[GPAR] Governance, Public Administration 
Reform. 2004. Governance, Public 
Administration Reform and Decentralised 
Service Delivery in Saravane Province: Proposed 
Project Strategy and Concept. Vientiane: United 
Nations Development Programme and United 
Nations Capital Development Fund.
Haberecht S. 2009. From rice to rubber. 
Development, transformation, and foreign 
investment in Northern Laos: An actor-oriented 
approach [Diploma Thesis]. Bielefeld: Faculty of 
Sociology, University of Bielefeld.
The context of REDD+ in the Lao People’s Democratic Republic | 49
Hanh D, Michaelowa A and De Jong F. 2006. 
From GHGs Abatement Potential to Viable 
CDM Projects: The Cases of Cambodia, Lao 
PDR and Vietnam. Hamburg, Germany: 
Hamburg Institute of International 
Economics.
Hanssen C. 2007. Lao land concessions: 
Development for the people? Presentation, 
International Conference on Poverty 
Reduction and Forests: Tenure, Market and 
Policy Reforms, RECOFTC, Bangkok. 3–7 
September.
Hett C, Castella JC, Heinimann A, Messerli P 
and Pfund JL. 2011a. A landscape mosaics 
approach for characterizing swidden systems 
from a REDD+ perspective. Applied Geography 
32:608–618.
Hett C, Heinimann A and Messerli P. 2011b. 
Spatial assessment of carbon stocks of living 
vegetation at the national level in Lao PDR. 
Geografisk Tidsskrift 111(1):11–26. 
Hosonuma N, Herold M, De Sy V, De Fries 
RS, Brockhaus M, Verchot L, Angelsen 
A and Romijn E. 2012. An assessment of 
deforestation and forest degradation drivers in 
developing countries. Environmental Research 
Letters 7(4):044009. doi:10.1088/1748-
9326/7/4/044009
[IGES] Institute for Global Environmental 
Strategies and [MoNRE] Ministry of Natural 
Resources and Environment. 2011. Market 
mechanisms country facts sheet: Lao PDR. 
Vientiane: Institute for Global Environmental 
Strategies and Ministry of Natural Resources 
and Environment of Lao PDR.
[IWGIA] International Work Group for 
Indigenous Affairs. 2010. The Indigenous 
World 2010. Copenhagen: International Work 
Group for Indigenous Affairs.
Kenney-Lazar M. 2010. Land Concessions, Land 
Tenure, and Livelihood Change: Plantation 
Development in Attapeu Province, Southern 
Laos. Vientiane: Faculty of Forestry, National 
University of Laos.
Kenney-Lazar M. 2012. Plantation rubber, land 
grabbing and social-property transformation 
in southern Laos. Journal of Peasant Studies 
39(3):1017–1037.
Kyophilvong P. 2009. Mining sector in Laos. In 
Uchikawa S, ed. Major Industries and Business 
Chance in CLMV Countries. BRC Research 
Report No. 2. Tokyo: Institute of Developing 
Economies–Japanese External Trade 
Organization (IDE–JETRO). 69–100. http://
www.ide.go.jp/English/Publish/Download/
Brc/pdf/02_ch3.pdf
Lang C. 2001. Deforestation in Vietnam, Laos and 
Cambodia. In Vajpeyi D, ed. Deforestation, 
Environment and Sustainable Development: A 
Comparative Analysis. Westport CT: Praeger. 
111–137.
Lawson S and MacFaul L. 2010. Illegal Logging and 
Related Trade: Indicators of the Global Response. 
London: Chatham House.
Lestrelin G, Bourgoin J, Bouahom B and 
Castella J-C. 2011. Measuring participation: 
Case studies on village land use planning 
in northern Lao PDR. Applied Geography 
31(3):950–958.
Lestrelin G, Castella J-C and Bourgoin J. 2012. 
Territorialising sustainable development: The 
politics of land-use planning in Laos. Journal 
of Contemporary Asia 42:581–602.
Lestrelin G, Castella JC and Fox J. 2013. Forest 
transitions in Southeast Asia: Synergies 
and shortcomings in land-change science 
and political ecology. In Braanstrom C and 
Vadjunec J, eds. Land-Change Science and 
Political Ecology for Sustainability: Synergies and 
Divergences. London: Earthscan. 48-65.
Lestrelin G and Giordano M. 2007. Upland 
development policy, livelihood change and 
land degradation: Interactions from a Laotian 
village. Land Degradation and Development 
18:55–76.
Lestrelin G. 2010. Land degradation in the Lao 
PDR: Discourses and policy. Land Use Policy 
27(2):424–439.
Liu M and Sigaty T. 2009. Legal Analysis of 
Communal Land and Communal Title in the 
Lao PDR. Vientiane: Rights-Link.
[MAF] Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry 
and [NLMA] National Land Management 
Authority. 2009 Manual on participatory 
agriculture and forest land use planning at 
village and village cluster levels. Vientiane: 
Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry and 
National Land Management Authority.
Mann CC. 2009. Addicted to rubber. Science 
325:564–566.
Matthews N. 2012. Water grabbing in the Mekong 
Basin: An analysis of the winners and losers 
of Thailand’s hydropower development in Lao 
PDR. Water Alternatives 5(2):392–411.
McAllister K. 2012. Rubber, rights and resistance: 
The evolution of local struggles against a 
50 | Lestrelin G, Trockenbrodt M, Phanvilay K, Thongmanivong S, Vongvisouk T, Pham TT and Castella J-C. 
Chinese rubber concession in Northern Laos. 
Presentation, International Conference on 
Global Land Grabbing II. Department of 
Sociology, Cornell University, 17–19 October.
McDermott M, Mahanty S and Schreckenberg K. 
2012. Examining equity: A multidimensional 
framework for assessing equity in payments 
for ecosystem services, Environmental Science 
and Policy, http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.
envsci.2012.10.006
Messerli P, Heinimann A and Epprecht M. 2009. 
Finding homogeneity in heterogeneity: A new 
approach to quantifying landscape mosaics 
developed for the Lao PDR. Human Ecology 
37(3):291–304.
Messerli P, Heinimann A, Epprecht M, Phonesaly 
S, Thiraka C and Minot N, eds. 2008. Socio-
Economic Atlas of the Lao PDR: An Analysis 
based on the 2005 Population and Housing 
Census. Bern and Vientiane: Swiss National 
Center of Competence in Research North–
South, University of Bern, Bern. http://www.
laoatlas.net/links/PDF/Socioeconomic_Atlas_
LAO_PDR.pdf 
Meyfroidt P, Rudel TK and Lambin EF. 2010. 
Forest transitions, trade, and the global 
displacement of land use. Proceedings of the 
National Academy of Sciences 107(49):20917–
20922.
Moore C, Ferrand J and Khiewvongphachan X. 
2011. Assessing the Feasibility of a REDD+ 
Project in the Nam Et Phou Louey National 
Protected Area, Laos, to Access the Voluntary 
Carbon Markets. Vientiane: Wildlife 
Conservation Society.
Müller D and Suess S. 2011. Can the MODIS 
active fire hotspots be used to monitor vegetation 
fires in the Lao PDR? Prepared for the Climate 
Protection through Avoided Deforestation 
(CliPAD) programme, Deutsche Gesellschaft 
für Internationale Zusammenarbeit (GIZ). 
Vientiane. http://amor.cms.hu-berlin.
de/~muelleda/download/Mueller_&_
Suess_2011_MODIS_fire_hotspots_to_
monitor_vegetation_fires_in_Laos.pdf 
Muziol C, Quang Tan N and Oberndorf R. 2011. 
Supporting REDD+ Implementation in Laos 
Through the Design of a REDD+-compliant 
Benefit Distribution System. Bangkok: 
International Union for Conservation of 
Nature.
Nanthavong V, Schoenweger O, Anouvong V, 
Khiamsombath C, Thiangthammavong L 
and Lathsavong S. 2009. Findings of the 
State Land Lease/Concession Inventory Project 
in the Pilot Province of Vientiane, Lao PDR 
– Phase II. Vientiane, Lao PDR: National 
Land Management Authority (NMLA), 
Land and Natural Resource Research and 
Information Centre. 
[NLMA] National Land Management Authority. 
2009. Findings of the State Land Lease/
Concession Inventory Project in the Pilot 
Province of Vientiane, Lao PDR. Vientiane: 
National Land Management Authority.
Ounekham K. 2011. Current Status of REDD+ 
in Lao PDR. Presentation, Asian Forum on 
Carbon Update 2011. Bandung, Indonesia, 
14–17 March. 
Pescott M, Durst P and Leslie R. 2010. Forest Law 
Enforcement and Governance: Progress in Asia 
and the Pacific. Bangkok: Food and Agriculture 
Organization of the United Nations.
Phiathep O. 2002. Desk Study on National 
Woodfuels and Wood Energy Information 
Analysis Lao PDR. Draft. Vientiane: Ministry 
of Agriculture and Forestry and EC–FAO 
Partnership Programme.
Phimmavong S, Ozarska B, Midgley S and Keenan 
R. 2009. Forest and plantation development 
in Laos: History, development and impact 
for rural communities. International Forestry 
Review 11(4):501–513.
Proforest. 2011. FLEGT-REDD+ linkages: Working 
together effectively. Briefing note No. 3. 
Brussels: Proforest.
Puustjaervi E. 2011. Legislative Priorities for Forestry 
Sector. Presentation, National Workshop, 
“Private Sector Engagement in Lao PDR for 
REDD+”, 1 July. Department of Forestry, Lao 
PDR. http://www.forestcarbonasia.org/wp-
content/uploads/2010/10/National-Assembly-
30-March-2011-rev.pdf 
Rigg J. 2005. Living with Transition in Laos: 
Market Integration in Southeast Asia. London 
and New York: Routledge.
Robichaud WG, Sinclair AR, Odarkor-Lanquaye 
N and Klinkenberg B. 2009. Stable forest 
cover under increasing populations of swidden 
cultivators in central Laos: The roles of 
intrinsic culture and extrinsic wildlife trade. 
The context of REDD+ in the Lao People’s Democratic Republic | 51
Ecology and Society 14(1):33. http://www.
ecologyandsociety.org/vol14/iss1/art33/ 
Romagny L and Daviau S. 2003. Synthesis of 
Reports on Resettlement in Long District, Luang 
Namtha Province, Lao PDR. Vientiane: Action 
Contre la Faim.
Schoenweger O and Üllenberg A. 2009. Foreign 
Direct Investment (FDI) in Land in the Lao 
PDR. Eschborn, Germany: GTZ.
Seidenberg C, Mertz O and Kias MB. 2003. 
Fallow, labour and livelihood in shifting 
cultivation: Implications for deforestation 
in northern Lao PDR. Geografisk Tidsskrift 
103(2):71–80. http://rdgs.dk/djg/
pdfs/103/2/07.pdf 
Shi W. 2008. Rubber Boom in Luang Namtha: A 
Transnational Perspective. Vientiane: GTZ.
Shi W. 2009. Summary and Analysis: Plan 
for Industrial Economic Development and 
Cooperation in Northern Lao PDR (The 
Northern Plan). Vientiane: GTZ.
Sipaseuth P and Hunt G. 2009. Overview on 
Customary Land Rights in Laos: Communities, 
Land, Forest and the Clash of big Agri-business 
in one of the Last Frontiers of the Southeast 
Asian Wilderness. Presentation, Regional 
Conference on Customary Land Rights in 
Southeast Asia, Phnom Penh, 18–22 October.
Souvanthong P. 1995. Shifting cultivation in 
Lao PDR: An overview of land use and policy 
initiatives. IIED Forestry and Land Use Series 
No. 5. London: International Institute for 
Environment and Development. http://pubs.
iied.org/7515IIED.html 
Stenhouse R and Bojö J. 2011. An environmental 
perspective on hydropower and mining 
development in the Lao PDR. Background 
Paper for Lao PDR Development Report 
2010: Natural Resource Management for 
Sustainable Development. Washington, 
D.C.: World Bank. http://siteresources.
worldbank.org/LAOPRDEXTN/
Resources/293683-1301084874098/
LDR2010_Environment.pdf 
Stibig HJ, Stolle F, Dennis R and Feldkötter 
C. 2007. Forest Cover Change in Southeast 
Asia: The Regional Pattern. Joint Research 
Centre, European Commission. 
Luxembourg: Office for Official Publications 
of the European Communities. http://
publications.jrc.ec.europa.eu/repository/
bitstream/111111111/477/1/eur%20
22896%20forest%20change%20pattern%20
se-asia.pdf 
Stuart-Fox M. 2005. Politics and Reform in the Lao 
People’s Democratic Republic. Asia Research 
Center working paper No. 126. Perth, 
Australia: Murdoch University.
Tan D. 2012. “Small is beautiful”: Lessons from 
Laos for the study of Chinese overseas. Journal 
of Current Chinese Affairs 41(2):61–94.
Thomas I, Chorn Nak, Braeutigam D, 
Thongmanivong S, Boulidam S, Phimminith 
T, Hurni K and Hett C. 2010. Analysis of land 
use and forest changes and related driving forces 
in the Lao PDR. A contribution to the REDD+ 
Readiness Plan. Vientiane: Department of 
Forestry/Forestry Strategy Implementation 
Project. Unpublished.
[TNI] Transnational Institute. 2010. Alternative 
development or business as usual? China’s 
opium substitution policy in Burma and Laos. 
Drug Policy Briefing No. 33. Amsterdam: 
Transnational Institute.
Trockenbrodt M. 2008. Reduced emissions from 
deforestation and forest degradation (REDD+) 
in Lao PDR: Information paper. Vientiane: 
Faculty of Forestry, National University 
of Laos.
[UNDP] United Nations Development 
Programme. 2010. Turning land into capital: 
Maximizing the benefits for Lao PDR, some 
international perspectives. Presentation, 
National Seminar on Turning Land into 
Capital, National Land Management Agency, 
SDC, LIWG and UNDP, 7 October.
[UNIDO] United Nations Industrial Development 
Organization. 2003. Lao PDR: Medium-
term strategy and action plan for industrial 
development. Final Report. Vientiane: UNIDO 
and Ministry of Industry and Handicrafts.
UN-REDD+. 2012. Lao PDR and Morocco join 
the UN-REDD+ Programme. UN-REDD+ 
Programme Newsletter 34 (November).
Vandergeest P. 2003. Land to some tillers: 
Development-induced displacement in 
Laos. International Social Science Journal 
55(175):47–56.
Vientiane Times. 2012a. Laos seeks larger EU 
market for forest products. Vientiane Times, 
10 January.
Vientiane Times. 2012b. Laos, Germany agree 
support for timber trade control. Vientiane 
Times, 9 October.
52 | Lestrelin G, Trockenbrodt M, Phanvilay K, Thongmanivong S, Vongvisouk T, Pham TT and Castella J-C. 
Vientiane Times. 2012c. New Chip Xeng Group to 
tap carbon market. Vientiane Times, 13 March.
Wang S, Cornelis van Kooten G and Wilson B. 
2004. Mosaic of reform: Forest policy in 
post-1978 China. Forest Policy and Economics 
6(1):71–83.
Watt P. 2010. Lao PDR Reference Scenario of 
Deforestation and Degradation. Draft Report 
22. July 2010, Revision No. 7. In support of 
FCPF R-PP Development. Pöyry Management 
Consulting (NZ) Limited. Unpublished.
Wellmann D. 2012. The Legal Framework of State 
Land Leases and Concessions in the Lao PDR. 
Vientiane, GIZ.
Woods K, Barney K and Canby K. 2011. EU 
FLEGT Baseline Study 5, Thailand: Overview 
of Forest Governance, Markets and Trade. 
Kuala Lumpur: European Forest Institute, 
FLEGT Asia.
World Bank. 2001. Lao PDR production forestry 
policy. Status and issues for dialogue. Volume 1. 
Main report. http://siteresources.worldbank. 
org/INTEAPREGTOPRURDEV/Resources/ 
573691-1141228934263/2280904-
1141235236951/Production_Forestry_Policy-
Vol1.pdf 
World Bank. 2005. Lao PDR Environment Monitor. 
Washington DC: World Bank.
World Bank. 2011a. Improving Forest Governance 
in the Mekong Region: Options for Regional 
Activities in Support of National Programs. 
Washington, DC: World Bank, Program on 
Forests (PROFOR).
World Bank. 2011b. Lao PDR economic monitor, 
May 2011: Robust growth amidst inflationary 
concerns. Vientiane: World Bank.
[WTO] World Trade Organization. 2011. Laos’ 
membership talks move to first draft of key 
concluding document. WTO News, 29 June.
Center for International Forestry Research (CIFOR)
CIFOR advances human well-being, environmental conservation and equity by conducting research to help shape 
policies and practices that affect forests in developing countries. CIFOR is a member of the CGIAR Consortium. Our 
headquarters are in Bogor, Indonesia, with offices in Asia, Africa and South America.
This report explores the drivers (both direct and indirect) of deforestation and forest degradation and discusses 
the political, economic and social opportunities and constraints that will influence the design and implementation 
of REDD+ in Laos. The government of Laos has long sought to curb deforestation and forest degradation, and the 
country is receiving considerable international attention and support to implement REDD+. However, agricultural 
expansion, the development of industrial tree plantations, and large hydropower, mining and infrastructure 
projects continue to result in deforestation, with shifting cultivation and selective logging (legal and illegal) largely 
blamed for forest degradation. At the same time, indirect drivers of deforestation and forest degradation are 
rooted in a national agenda of economic growth, characterized by incentives for foreign and domestic investment 
in forest management and timber harvesting. As a result, Laos is becoming an important resource frontier for 
transnational capital and large-scale land and natural resource investments. The consequent intensification of 
competition for resources poses a challenge not only for forest governance, but also for the development of 
REDD+ policies and initiatives.
In an examination of the institutions and policies defining Laos’ forestry sector and REDD+, the report reflects 
on lessons to be learned from past forestry and economic development policies. The government of Laos has 
demonstrated strong political interest in REDD+, but REDD+ implementation faces major obstacles, particularly 
unclear carbon rights and weak governance, with the latter attributable to poor local capacity, weak coordination 
among stakeholders, and minimal involvement by local communities and civil society. 
The report makes several recommendations for achieving effective, efficient and equitable outcomes of REDD+ 
in Laos: capacity building of administrative and technical staff, especially at the subnational level; clarification and 
harmonization of land-use planning and land allocation processes; and stronger monitoring and law enforcement 
in areas under high threat of deforestation and forest degradation. Furthermore, an accountable and transparent 
mechanism for sharing the benefits of REDD+ across levels and fully accountable consultation processes must be 
implemented, with the participation of not only elite and powerful actors such as domestic and foreign businesses 
but also local groups and civil society.
Occasional Papers contain research results that are significant to tropical forest issues. 
This content has been peer reviewed internally and externally.
cifor.org ForestsClimateChange.org
This research was carried out by CIFOR as part of the CGIAR Research Program on Forests, Trees and 
Agroforestry (CRP-FTA). This collaborative program aims to enhance the management and use of 
forests, agroforestry and tree genetic resources across the landscape from forests to farms. CIFOR 
leads CRP-FTA in partnership with Bioversity International, CIRAD, the International Center for Tropical 
Agriculture and the World Agroforestry Centre.
